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5Eecutive Summary
With the advent of the Internet a new public sphere has 
come into being that has changed modes of  creation and 
consumption of media content where new actors oer online 
services and individual users can receive and impart information 
regardless of frontiers. New media and user-generated content 
greatly enhance the diversity and plurality of online content 
and allow an unprecedented parallelism of professional 
and journalistic content and individual speech empowering 
individual citizens and ordinary users.
PAr t  I  Epea e pacice  ie ce eai
European best practices of online content regulation rest on the shared understanding of the Council 
of Europe and the European Union institutions to protect the freedom of epression online of all ac-
tors. First and foremost, communications via the Internet should not be subject to any stricter content 
rules than other spheres of epression, thus rearming the overarching principle that state interven-
tions into the right to freedom of epression and media freedoms in particular must meet the require-
ments of strict necessity, minimum intervention, and the protection of from unduly interference.
In recognition of the dierent roles and activities of actors in the new media environment the Council 
of Europe promotes a graduated and dierentiated approach in state legislation that encompasses 
a new broad notion of the media. This approach requires that “each actor whose services are iden-
tied as media or as an intermediary or auiliary activity benet from both the appropriate form 
dierentiated and the appropriate level graduated of protection” in addition to individuals’ right to 
freely seek and impart information regardless of frontiers. The European Union policy and legislation 
takes a similar direction providing for tailored liability eceptions for certain online intermediaries.
State actions that aim to protect individuals’ personality rights, their reputation and private life, should 
correspond with these principles and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights which to-
gether outline a coherent and comprehensive frameworks for the regulation of online content at the 
national level. The respect of individuals’ right to reputation and private life can be a legitimate limita-
tion to the freedom of epression, however, measures should be calibrated according to the roles and 
activities of the actors in the provision of content and the interference must be balanced taking into 
account the type of speech, the role of the actors involved, the political relevance and public interest, 
among others.
European best practice thus forestall any one-size-ts-all measures against defamatory online content 
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and need to be eible so as to take into account the particular circumstances of the epression and 
personal characteristics of the parties concerned. Under a graduated and dierentiated approach, 
internet intermediaries’ responsibility for hosting online content of third parties has to be determined 
according to the specic nature of the service they oer. The Council of Europe standard-setting doc-
uments and EU legislation provide for a limitation of liability and exclude a specic duty to monitor 
the information they receive from users on part of hosting providers which in their role and function 
remain passive service providers.
The European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber judgement in Del v Estonia concerns a case 
where the defendant played an active role in facilitating the posting of unlawful third-party com-
ments and was thus treated like a “professional” publisher with all responsibilities for the content on 
its website. This judgement, however, does not overturn the principle that “passive” online interme-
diaries that provide for the hosting services would not be liable for third party content. Despite the 
dierences of jurisprudence at the national level and with the notable eception of Turkey, European 
countries’ legislation does not establish a general liability regime for providers of hosting services.
PAr t  II  Aaia ad ie ce eai
Against the background of European best practices in online content regulation, the study consid-
ered in  particular a pending legislative proposal in Albania which seeks to introduce “liability for 
online publication of comments that infringe upon a person’s honour, personality or reputation” on 
providers of “electronic portals”. The study’s assessment of the proposal concludes that it conicts 
with the graduated and dierentiated approach promulgated by the relevant CoE standard-setting 
instruments, vastly eceeds the ECtHR interpretation in the Del judgement and would clash with the 
EU aquis, particularly with Art. 14 and 15a of the e-Commerce Directive.
In light of the above considerations, the necessity of a legislative intervention in Albania at this time, 
along the lines of the Bregu proposal, appears less than compelling. It may be more advisable, as in 
the Estonian Del case which was based on the general civil law defamation rules, to allow the courts 
to develop more nuanced rules in this eld, under the guidance of the ECtHR. With the eception 
of England and Wales, which undertook in 2013 long-planned, comprehensive reforms of their def-
amation laws, no other EU member state has adopted specic laws for online defamation. This has 
allowed their court systems to gradually develop the case law, taking account of fast changes in tech-
nology, information ecosystems and societal attitudes.
If enacted this legislation would retrograde the advancements made with the 2012 reforms to the 
Albanian civil and criminal defamation laws, introduce an unorganic and unbalanced measure direct-
ed against all content and hosting providers that is ecessively restraining the freedom of epression 
online.
In particular, the study identies the following shortcomings:
1. The denition of “electronic portal” to overly broad, thus capturing “passive” intermediaries con-
trary to European best practices and the EU aquis; the denition does also not allow for taking 
7into account the dening characteristics of the service but automatically places the obligations of 
“active” intermediaries on all providers;
2. To the etent that “passive” intermediaries would be regulated the proposal contradicts with Art. 
17 of the Albanian ECA which provides for a liability eception for hosting services analogue to 
Art. 14 of the EU e-Commerce Directive;
3. The obligation on portal administrators to prevent the publication of any oending third-party 
content amounts to a duty to monitor information contrary to the EU aquis;
4. The obligation would appear to apply horizontally to all providers of “electronic portals” irrespec-
tive whether they are established in Albania or abroad but the proposal does not include issues 
of jurisdiction or consider practicalities of etraterritorial enforcement.
5. This in turn can amount to a violation of Art. 3 2 of the e-Commerce Directive because it would 
alter the requirements for providers established in another member state within the coordinated 
eld of activities;
6. The general obligations for the content and the take-down procedure do not allow for a balanc-
ing eercise taking into account the type of speech, the role of the actors involved, the political 
relevance and public interest, among others, pursuant to the established case-law of the ECtHR; 
7. The legislative proposal lacks procedural safeguards, in particular that courts should primarily as-
sess whether online content is infringing third party’s reputation, or at least which requirements 
the notice has to comply with and other rights and means to assess and protest the notice; and
In light of the above considerations, the study recommends the Albanian legislator not to adopt this 
legislative proposal. It should be recalled that the Estonian Del case was based on the general civil 
law defamation rules and not on dedicated piece of legislation placing a general obligation on pro-
viders of hosting services for all published content, irrespective whether this is own or third party 
content and the provider’s activities are passive intermediary or rather media/ “active” intermediary. 
In light of the fundamental right to the freedom of epression and the recommended nuanced ap-
proach Albanian decision-makers should allow the courts to develop case-law, under the guidance of 
the ECtHR, based on the criteria in Art. Art. 647/a of the civil code.
In order to communicate how the present legal framework applies to the situation of hosting provid-
ers it is recommended:
1. to disseminate this study widely to all stakeholders;
2. to organize a workshop for policy-makers and stakeholders covering the legislative status quo 
in Albania against the backdrop of European best practices and developments in the case law of 
the European courts; in particular the workshop should aim to convey the qualied requirements 
promulgated in the ECtHR Del-judgement;
3. to organize a workshop for judges on the case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU relevant to de-
famatory content online, in particular how both courts balance the infringement of individual’s 
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reputation and other rights with the freedom of epression online;
4. to promote self-regulation of hosting providers and assist with an overview of best practices and 
measures deployed by local and foreign hosting providers;
5. to educate the public about already available remedies in Albanian law against online defama-
tion, infringement of privacy and other unlawful content. These include the hardly used no-
tice-and-takedown system of the Albanian ECA.
6. to set-up a dedicated website to promote the public awareness of individual user’s possible rem-
edies against online defamation, infringement of privacy and other unlawful content. Inter alia, 
this website should provide an accessible overview over the mechanisms deployed by the most 
commonly used hosting providers in Albania and links to their reporting tools and notice-and-ac-
tion schemes.
9
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Introduction
The advent of the Internet and, in particular, of Web 2.0, has changed modes of both, creation and 
consumption of media content, and consequently challenged consolidated assumptions about legal 
safeguards for the right to freedom of epression that is protected as a fundamental right by core 
human rights instruments at the European regional level and in European states’ constitutions.1 On 
the one hand, Internet-mediated communications and publishing are heralded as enablers for the 
eercise of freedom of epression which allow greater participation in the public discourse. A new 
public sphere has come into being that challenges former gatekeeper positions which required ac-
cess to distribution infrastructure and/ or substantial resources for content production characteristic 
of traditional media, such as the press and broadcasting media, where new actors oer online ser-
vices and individual users can receive and impart information regardless of frontiers. New media and 
user-generated content greatly enhance the diversity and plurality of online content and allow an 
unprecedented parallelism of professional and journalistic content and individual speech empower-
ing individual citizens and ordinary users.
The boost for the eercise of the freedom of epression is a most welcome and positive develop-
ment as recognised in numerous documents by the Council of Europe and the European Union. The 
practice however also shows that the eercise of the freedom of epression online can at times in-
terfere with individuals’ reputation or rights of others, among other issues. Striking the right balance 
between conicting positions of rights while keeping state interventions minimal is thus not less 
important in Internet communications as it was in the contet of traditional media and individual 
speech. The Council of Europe maintains that communication on the Web should not be subject to 
any stricter content rules or restrictions than any other medium2 and that state interventions into the 
right to freedom of epression and media freedoms in particular should be guided by similar general 
regulatory principles irrespective whether or not professional media outlets, intermediaries or indi-
vidual users are involved.
It its standard-setting work the Council of Europe has given much attention to the protection of free-
dom of epression in the new media environment which has clearly been a focal point of its activities 
in recent years. The 2007 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on pro-
moting freedom of epression and information in the new information and communications environ-
ment3 recommends guidelines which rest on the empowerment of private users, the accessibility of 
ICT infrastructure and information, and international common standards to foster content creation 
and cooperation among stakeholders.
The rich body of case law of the European Court of Human Rights ECtHR on how to balance the 
freedom of epression with the reputation and rights of others oers ample guidance as to how to 
1.   Notably in Art 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Art 11(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (CFR) of the European Union.
2.   Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 May 2003. Cf. Principle 1: “Member 
states should not subject content on the Internet to restrictions which go further than those applied to other means of content delivery.”
3.   CM/Rec(2007)11, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 26 September 2007. 
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resolve conicting positions of rights. The most actual ECtHR decision in Del v Estonia contributes an 
important piece to the legal puzzle under which circumstances an Internet news portal can be liable 
for user comments which even cross the boundary of defamatory content but are deemed hateful 
and racist.4 This decision and also the 2014 Court of Justice of the European Union CJEU decision in 
the case Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v AEPD, Mario Costeja González which nds in favour of a right to 
be delisted from a search engine’s list of result following a search based on an individual’s name5 have 
sparked much controversy. However, upon closer reading these cases are not framing a general lia-
bility regime of Internet Service Providers ISPs but formulate specic legal requirements which have 
to be met in order to rely on either judgement. The case law does not lent itself to argue for the intro-
duction of a general secondary liability of ISP for third party content. Their reading and interpretation 
should be placed in light of the overarching principles on the protection of freedom of epression 
online as devised by the Council of Europe, among others.
As part of the project “Promoting freedom of epression and information and freedom of the media in 
South-East Europe SEE” the Council of Europe commissioned this comparative study of best Europe-
an practices of online content regulation, in particular defamation online. This study seeks to inform 
legislators, policy-makers, traditional and new media organisations as well as civil society about Euro-
pean standards and best practices in online content regulation and seeks to promote proportionate 
measures to protect individuals’ reputations and personality rights. The study proceeds in two parts: 
Pa I of the study covers the Council of Europe and European Union standards on online regulation 
with a particular view on online speech and defamatory content and it eplores dierent modes of 
implementation and enforcement at the national level. Pa II of the study introduces and evaluates 
a recent legislative proposals pending in Albania which if adopted would introduce far-reaching civil 
liability for online content the so-called Bregu proposal.
This study proceeds as follows: In Pa I, its rst section revisits European standards of online content 
regulation starting with the Council of Europe system followed by European Union law relevant in the 
contet of online content regulation. The net section takes up the major challenges for public policy 
in the contet of online content regulation and introduces selected European countries’ eperiences 
in this eld to show the practical limitations of any unfettered approach to online content regulation. 
Pa II to Albania and interrogates its national legislation and the pending legislative proposal in the 
light of the previous sections in order to discern policy recommendations on how Albania can best 
conform with European best practices in online content regulation.
4.   ECtHR, Delǳ AS v. Estonia, application no. 64569/09, 18 March 2015, 12-13.
5.   CJEU, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v AEPD, Mario Costeja González, 13 May 2014.
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PAr t  I  
Eu r o PEAn  bEst  Pr ACt ICEs o f  o n l In E Co n t En t  r Eg u l At Io n
The CoE, because of its traditional mandate, has been particularly active throughout the years in cre-
ating a full body of principles and rules that apply to the protection of the freedom of epression 
online. The CoE bodies have repeatedly stressed the need for national authorities to end the current 
state of fragmentation of defamation laws and called for more attention to be paid to the ECtHR 
standards to be incorporated into national laws. The EU institutions concert with the policy approach 
and the EU acquis has made some particular inroads to the regulatory governance of online content 
in addition to stressing the relevance of the ECtHR standards to become applied at the national level 
across the European Union. There are also compelling policy arguments why the liability of Internet 
intermediaries is limited as a way to create condition that  are conducive to the operation of online 
intermediaries and users’ freedom of epression online.
1. Co u n CIl  o f  Eu r o PE
The advent of the Internet and, in particular, of Web 2.0 has changed modes of both creation and 
consumption of media content and consequently challenged consolidated assumptions about legal 
safeguards for the right to freedom of epression enshrined in Art. 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights ECHR.6 Within the Council of Europe system, a number of instruments have addressed 
the most relevant questions, delineating through the years a coherent yet comple assessment of 
the nature of freedom of epression in the online environment. As a guiding principle, it has been 
established that communication happening on the Web should not be subject to any stricter content 
rules or restrictions than any other medium.7 The Council of Europe maintains that state interventions 
into the right to freedom of epression and media freedoms in particular should be guided by similar 
general regulatory principles irrespective whether or not professional media outlets, intermediaries 
or individual users are involved. Recommended general principles include strict necessity, minimum 
intervention, and the protection of from unduly interference.8
1.1  A adaed ad dieeiaed appac
The Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on a new notion of media grasps 
the main challenges of regulating online media content in the contemporary technological land-
scape as follows:
“Despite the changes in its ecosystem, the role of the media in a democratic society, albeit 
with additional tools namely interaction and engagement, has not changed. Media-related 
6.   Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14 <http://conventions.coe.
int/ treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm> (accessed 10 August 2015).
7.   Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 May 2003. Cf. Principle 1: “Member 
states should not subject content on the Internet to restrictions which go further than those applied to other means of content delivery.”
8.   Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on a new notion of media, CM/Rec(2011)7, adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 21 September 2011, para. 59. 
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policy must therefore take full account of these and future developments, embracing a no-
tion of media which is appropriate for such a uid and multi-dimensional reality. All actors 
– whether new or traditional – who operate within the media ecosystem should be oered a 
policy framework which guarantees an appropriate level of protection and provides a clear 
indication of their duties and responsibilities in line with Council of Europe standards. The 
response should be adaed ad dieeiaed according to the part that media services 
play in content production and dissemination processes.”9
The eorts of the CoE institutions have been oriented towards a comple task of redening the limits 
and balance between already eisting principles that correspond to the new media environment. 
As phrased in the Recommendation the challenge for today’s policy-makers and regulators is “how 
to apply media standards to new media activities, services or actors in a graduated and dierentiat-
ed manner.”10 The practical impact of this approach entails that, rst and foremost, singling out the 
detailed legal safeguards that protect freedom of epression on the Internet is not an eercise in de-
vising brand new tailored-made provisions to t today’s technologies but, rather, an eort to under-
stand the unbalances that originate from the new environment and reassess the relevant provisions 
in an attempt to even out such unbalances.    
The CoE thus advocates an approach which requires that 
each actor whose services are identied as media or as an intermediary or auiliary activity 
benet from both the appropriate form dierentiated and the appropriate level graduated 
of protection and that responsibility is also delimited in conformity with Art 10 of the ECHR 
and other relevant CoE standards.11 
Solutions should ideally be eible – in order to keep at pace with the future further developments 
of technology, likely very fast –, in line with the principles devised by the CoE and suitable to provide 
adequate level of protection to the dierent actors involved in the production and dissemination of 
media content. In practical terms it matters whether an actor in the new online environment meets 
the revamped characteristic of media or -- a contrario – provides intermediary or auiliary activities 
because this allocation the appropriate level of regulatory intervention.
1.1.1 A new, broad notion of the media
The eort to dene what classies as media or not in today’s landscape impacts on the regulatory 
division of labour to a signicant etent. The Recommendation stresses a number of rights and pre-
rogatives such as the right to investigate and to fair access to distribution channels as well as duties 
such as respect for third parties’ rights that pertain to media outlets only because of the fundamen-
9.   Emphasize added. Ibid., para. 6.
10.   Ibid, para. 56.
11.   Ibid., Appendix, para. 7.
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tal role they have within democratic societies. Eamples of media privileges eplicitly mentioned in 
the Recommendation, with specic reference to the need for them to apply to the “new ecosystem”, 
include the use of defences of truthfulness and accuracy of information, good faith or public interest; 
a sharp dierence in the assessment of content from that of opinion, with the latter enjoying greater 
freedom, and a right to partake in satire and even eaggeration12.
The new online environment thus carries as a rst preliminary challenge a re-denition of the bound-
aries of the media ecosystem. Hence the Recommendation provides a set of indicators to help discern 
whether a new communication service should be regarded and regulated as a media outlet or rather 
as an intermediary.
Indicators of activities that fall under the notion of media include: 
- self-categorisation as a media outlet, membership in professional media organisations, working 
methods analogue to those typical of media organisations, and, in the new media environment, the 
capacity and the availability of technical means e.g. platform or bandwidth to disseminate content 
to large audiences online13; 
- the intent to produce, aggregate or disseminate media content, either through traditional or inno-
vative business models such as online platforms for sharing user-generated content14; 
- editorial control on the disseminated content, which can take various forms including those typical 
of some online platforms such as e-post moderation of UGC or predetermined internal procedures 
to comply with peer review and take down requests, when the ultimate decision, despite of the 
active involvement of users stay within the relevant organisation with ultimate decisions taken ac-
cording to an internally dened process and having regard to specied criteria15;
- compliance with professional, ethical and deontological standards, while conversely epecting to 
benet from widely common legal privileges attached to the legal professions16; 
- the scope of dissemination and outreach, taking into account both traditional and innovative means 
for transmission such as non-linear and on-demand delivery of content17;
- and nally the epectation from the public which should recognise and acknowledge media outlets 
as such – meaning that they respect the outlet as a reliable and trustworthy source of information.18
12.   Ibid., para. 67.
13.   Ibid., para.16-22.
14.   Ibid., para. 23-28.
15.   Ibid., para. 29-36.
16.   Ibid., para. 37-42.
17.   Ibid., para. 43-49.
18.   Ibid., para. 50-55.
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1.1.2. Intermediary or auxiliary activities
Intermediaries, on the contrary, are not formally dened by although eplicitly non-comprehensive 
sets of indicators as those provided for the media, and could likely be dened a contrario by the lack 
of one or more of those essential characteristics that instead dene the media. However, the Recom-
mendation does not overlook at the importance of such operators within the contemporary media 
and communications landscape, and acknowledges that they oer “alternative and complementary 
means or channels for the dissemination of media content” and contribute to fostering diversity and 
plurality within the media sphere.19 Intermediary or auiliary activities are situated on the opposite 
side of the spectrum of what is demanded in terms of a graduated and dierentiated approach to 
legal responsibilities and privileges in the new media environment. Typically, such actors are not re-
quired to observe media specic requirements for the reason that they do not have any inuence 
over the content and activities of their users are thus “paie” in that regard. In some cases, this de-
lineation can amount to treading a ne line until ECtHR jurisprudence provides further guidance on 
this question, such as the recent Grand Chamber judgement in the Del case cf. supra 2.1.2.3.
1.2  t e ik eee deaai, eed  peec ad decac
Within the contet of the European Convention on Human Rights, freedom of speech is acknowl-
edged as a fundamental freedom although far from unlimited: the  “protection of the reputation or 
rights of others” is acknowledged by Art 102 as a ground for state authorities to impose lawful re-
striction to freedom of epression. As in the case of other restrictions to free speech, such limitations 
must be prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society; furthermore, the European Court 
of Human Rights has repeatedly stressed the need for such limitations to be constructed narrowly20; 
the possible conict between these two competing rights is to be decided through a process of a
aci  cpei iee21 – the Court thus implicitly refusing to establish a hierarchy between 
the two. However, it emerges from the combined analysis of the CoE standards and the case-law of 
the ECtHR that the balance is most likely to tip on the side of freedom of epression when the nature 
of the speech is of relevance to the public interest, as stressed at last in the Declaration on freedom 
of political debate in the media22. 
In a general perspective, striking a balance between the two has proven to be a challenging eercise 
and consistency lacks across national jurisdiction. The Council of Europe has recently epressed con-
cern for such a lack of uniformity: 
“In defamation cases, a ne balance must be struck between guaranteeing the fundamental 
right to freedom of epression and protecting a person’s honour and reputation. The propor-
tionality of this balance is judged dierently in dierent member states within the Council of 
Europe. This has led to substantial variations in the stringency of defamation law or case law, 
for eample dierent degrees of attributed damages and procedural costs, varying deni-
19.   Ibid., para. 63.
20.   ECtHR, Grinberg v. Russia, application no. 23472/03, 21 July 2005.
21.   ECtHR, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway, Application no. 21980/93, 20 May 1999, 324. 
22.   Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 February 2004. Cf. para. I: “Pluralist democracy and freedom of political debate require that the 
public is informed about matters of public concern, which includes the right of the media to disseminate negative information and critical opinions 
concerning political ǳgures and public oǵ cials, as well as the right of the public to receive them.” 
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tions of rst publication and the related statute of limitations or the reversal of the burden of 
proof in some jurisdictions.”23 
The Council has further stressed the need for a “reform of the legislation on libel/defamation in mem-
ber states … in line with the requirements set out in the case law of the Court.”24
Defamation actions at the national level have been considered as a potential threat to freedom of 
the media, because of their potential chilling eect. The Recommendation on Freedom of expression 
in the media in Europe25  urged Member States to bring their national legislations in line with the rele-
vant standards and recommendations of the Coe and the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The case-law of the ECtHR is indeed particularly rich of indications on the scope and boundaries 
of free speech and defamation laws under the CoE system. As mentioned above already, the advent 
of the Internet has not challenged directly such orientations, which remain valid under the current 
technological landscape. On the contrary, in the most recent Recommendation on a new notion of 
media the Committee of Ministers has further recommended that “as a form of interference, any reg-
ulation should itself comply with the requirements set out in Art. 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the standards that stem from the relevant case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights.”26
The ECtHR has not provided a unitary denition of hate speech as such, although the now conspicuous 
body of case-law rendered on Art 10 has provided the boundaries of what constitutes an acceptable 
interference with Art 10; the denition of Art 10 as outlined by the ECtHR case-law thus follows an a 
contrario criterion to understand what forms of speech constitute an unlawful interference with the 
rights of the others and what are, instead, protected by Art 10. Particular attention has been brought 
to a number of qualifying circumstances. 
• Inregardoftherstcircumstance–thenatureandcontentofthespeech–theCourthastra-
ditionally granted stronger protection to piica peec ad ae  pic iee i eea 
the Court has denied that a sharp distinction between the two eists27, under the assumption that 
such topics are of the highest relevance to the democratic debate and interference should thus be 
kept to a minimum, as noted in some early seminal decisions28. The Court has insisted repeatedly that 
it is a specic duty of the press to impart information on political questions and on other matters of 
public interest and this requires that national lawmakers and courts take into account “that the press 
plays a pre-eminent role in a State governed by the rule of law29” when deciding on the boundaries of 
legitimate speech in such matters.  
However, the prominence of political and public interest matters applies as a stand-alone criterion to 
23.   Steering Committee on the Media and New Communication Services, ‘Draft declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the desirability of 
international standards dealing with forum shopping in respect of defamation, “libel tourism”, to ensure freedom of expression’, CDMC(2011)018Rev8, 
2012, 2.
24.   Ibid., 4.
25.   Rec 1589 (2003), adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 28 January 2003.
26.   Cf. Ibid., para. 4.
27.   ECtHR, Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, Application no. 13778/88, 25 June 1992, 64.
28.   Cf. ECtHR, Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, application no. 6538/74, 26 April 1979; Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, appli-
cation no. 13585/88, 26 November 1991.
29.   ECtHR, Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, Application no. 15974/90, 26 April 1995, 34.
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discern the relevance of the speech, even independently from the logically consequent pre-eminent 
role of the press, and thus protects as well private citizens when they raise “issues capable of aecting 
the general interest30” through various means such as for instance open letters – or rather more perva-
sive and far-reaching digital technologies available today.  
• AfurtherdistinctionestablishedbytheCourtfocusesonaejde ad ac – the 
former being opinions epressed by the author of the speech which, because of their very nature, 
cannot be proven true. The likes of questioning an elected politician’s morality31, calling them an idiot32 
and even comparing their ideas to Nazi propaganda33 thus do not necessarily constitute defamation. 
The Court has also stressed how the limits of acceptable form depend on the concrete circumstances 
and in particular on the dynamics of the ongoing public debate; the Court’s assessment, in a number 
of occasions, considered whether the allegedly defamatory comments were instead “proportionate to 
the stir and indignation caused by the matters alleged”34 and found them legitimate although severely 
critical. However, such limits seem to become signicantly narrower when the criticized person is a 
private rather than a public gure, such as for instance a school teacher: in such cases, the assessment 
of whether or not the critique has overstepped the boundaries of acceptable criticism include the pos-
sibility to epress the same thought with a dierent, less aictive choice of vocabulary and whether 
the words used went as far as suggesting that the defamed person had committed a crime in absence 
of a nal conviction, thus infringing the right to presumption of innocence.35  
• Thesecondstrand(pecia qaicai aaced  e deaed pe is to a certain 
etent related to the rst, inasmuch as, once established that a certain form of speech is of public interest 
due to its very own nature, and there thus eists a public’s right to know about it, the Court typically per-
forms a “test of necessity” aimed at considering whether the interference at stake is truly necessary in a 
democratic society. The test typically takes the form of a proportionality scrutiny and consists of weighting 
the competing rights of the persons allegedly defamed with the public’s right to know. The Court has rst 
envisaged the test in Handyside36 and then applied to dierent other professional categories.
The most relevant stream of decisions focuses on the issue of alleged deaai  piicia. 
The Court has stated that politicians must bear “close scrutiny of [their] every word and deed by both 
journalists and the public at large37” and “display a greater degree of tolerance, especially when [they 
themselves make] public statements that are susceptible of criticism38”, and thus concluded that the 
denition of what constitutes defamation in relation to politicians must necessarily be narrower than 
usual, for the “limits of acceptable criticism are … wider as regards a politician as such than as regards 
a private individual.”39  
30.   ECtHR, Marônek v. Slovakia, Application no. 32686/96, 19 April 2001, 56.
31.   ECtHR, Lingens v. Austria, Application no. 9815/82, 8 July 1986, 45.
32.   ECtHR, Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2), Application no. 20834/92, 1 July 1997, 34.
33.   ECtHR, Oberschlick v. Austria, Application no. 11662/85, 23 May 1991, 63; Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v. Austria, Application 
no. 39394/98, 13 November 2003, 41-46. 
34.   ECtHR, De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, Application no. 19983/92, 24 February 1997, 48.
35.   ECtHR, Constantinescu v. Romania, Application no. 28871/95, 27 June 2000, 71-74.
36.   ECtHR, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, application no. 5493/72, 7 December 1976.
37.   ECtHR, Lingens v. Austria, Application no. 9815/82, 8 July 1986, 42.
38.   ECtHR, Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2), Application no. 20834/92, 1 July 1997, 29.
39.   ECtHR, Lingens v. Austria, Application no. 9815/82, 8 July 1986, 42.
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It is noteworthy to mention that, in devising such principle, the Court seems to have attached the 
principle of the epected greater degree of tolerance the personal qualication of the defamed per-
sons – as elected politicians – more than to the professional qualication – as a professional journalist 
or not – of the authors of the alleged defamations. Hence, individual citizens’ comments online criti-
cizing politicians towards matters of public interest would be also met with greater tolerance.
The Court has taken a more varied approach in regard of democratic institutions. The strictest ap-
proach has been reserved to ee, in whose regard “the limits of permissible criticism are 
wider … than in relation to a private citizen, or even a politician” because of the dominant position in 
society that such bodies traditionally hold. Competent state authorities should thus pay the utmost 
attention to devising proportionate measures to balance the right to free epression with the need to 
protect the government’s reputation; criminal measures, although in theory admissible if “intended 
to react appropriately and without ecess to defamatory accusations devoid of foundation or formu-
lated in bad faith40”, should in principle be avoided, especially when other means are available for the 
government to respond to even unduly criticism and attacks. However, it is worth noting that the pro-
tection of the Government’s reputation has seldom been used as a stand-alone eception but rather 
jointly with other qualifying causes, such as for instance the prevention of disorder41. A similar reason-
ing has been applied to the case of ei ead  sae: even in spite of a legitimate interest such 
as safeguarding diplomatic relations with foreign states, granting special protection from criticism 
to such heads of state have been deemed disproportionate and “a special privilege that cannot be 
reconciled with modern practice and political conceptions.42” 
When the jdicia is instead implicated, the Court has been seemingly much more prone to allow 
for limitations of free speech in order to protect the judiciary’s reputation. The Court has considered 
the defamation occurs if accusations are brought against judges “personally” and are “likely to lower 
them in public esteem … without any supporting evidence43”. The analysis of the Court has consid-
ered the special need of the judiciary to rely on public trust in order not to see its institutional role 
undermined it “must enjoy public condence if it is to be successful in carrying out its duties44” along 
with the factual capacity of the allegedly defamed persons to defend themselves in other ways than 
judicial actions the “judges who have been criticised are subject to a duty of discretion that precludes 
them from replying45”. 
The analytical framework can thus be reconstructed as follows: the boundaries of legitimate and ac-
ceptable criticism can be considered to be more or less narrow according to some peculiar qualities 
of the institution addressed by the criticism; qualities to consider include whether the institution 
occupies a dominant position in the society, the need for the institution to enjoy public trust, the 
possibilities for the institution to build and strengthen such ties of trust for instance through elec-
tions, and the dierent means available to the institution to react and respond to the criticism. Such 
analysis suggests that institutions such as parliaments and governments enjoy greater possibilities, 
40.   ECtHR, Castells v. Spain, Application no. 11798/85, 23 April 1992, 46.
41.   Ibid., Application no. 11798/85, 23 April 1992, 39.
42.   ECtHR, Colombani and Others v. France, Application no. 51279/99, 25 June 2002, 68.
43.   ECtHR, Barfod v. Denmark, Application no. 11508/85, 22 February 1989, 35. 
44.   Ibid., 34.
45.   Ibid., 34.
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compared to the judiciary, to gain and reinforce public trust through cyclical elections and to engage 
in public debates with their critics and should therefore be prepared to endure harsher epressions 
of criticism – both in form and substance. Conversely, when the institution at stake benets from such 
circumstances to a lesser etent, the scrutiny of the criticism can be stricter, including for instance the 
accuracy of the critiques.46 The same analytical framework can be applied to other institutional bodies 
and gures such as public prosecutors47, police ocers48, civil servants49.
It is worth mentioning that the orientation followed by the Court is backed by other instruments ap-
proved by other CoE bodies. The centrality of freedom of speech in the democratic debate has been 
strongly and vehemently advocated by the Committee of Ministers in the Declaration on freedom of 
political debate in the media,50 in which the “right of the media to disseminate negative information 
and critical opinions concerning political gures and public ocials” which has a mirroring counter-
part in the public’s right to receive them is stated to be a necessary prerequisite to pluralist democ-
racy.  The Declaration stresses how political gures and public ocials must accept public scrutiny, 
and therefore should not receive stronger legal protection from robust and strong criticism, even 
insulting statements, satire and humorous epression – the boundaries for the last two being even 
wider – than ordinary citizens. This means that neither special legal remedies nor more severe penal-
ties should be provided for the protection of the reputation of such gures; furthermore, defamatory 
or insulting statements against the state, government and other representative institutions should 
not be criminalized by national laws.
1.2.1 The liability of professional journalists and the case of user-generated content
The rise of Web 2.0 has greatly increased the possibilities for non-professional media operators to 
have their voices heard by large audiences. The wide availability of web-hosting services for ordinary 
individuals to run their own blogs; web-sharing platforms such as, most famously, YouTube; and, per-
haps most importantly, social network websites such as Facebook and Twitter are blurring the lines 
between professional and journalistic content and UGC. At present state, a number of lawsuits led 
before national courts have triggered questions, and consequently sparked uncertainty, on whether 
gures such as a web-master, a blogger or even an occasional author of a post on an online forum 
could be held liable for possibly derogatory or defamatory content that appears on the Web.   
The lack of certainty sheds light on the relevance of the eort taken by the Committee of Ministers 
to devise indicators to help ascertain which operators congure as professional operators and which 
not; a sharper denition of the boundaries between the two would also help ascertain the dierent 
thresholds of responsibility faced by each category for the content they share. The ECtHR has not, 
thus far, tackled the question in a decisive fashion. However, a number of principles and illustrative 
indications can be inferred, either from the case-law or other instruments, to try and navigate this 
comple question.
46.   ECtHR, De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, Application no. 19983/92, 24 February 1997, 37. 
47.   ECtHR, Lešník v. Slovakia, Application no. 35640/97, 11 March 2003. 
48.   ECtHR, Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, Application no. 49017/99, 17 December 2004.  
49.   ECtHR, Busuioc v. Moldova, Application no. 61513/00, 21 December 2004.
50.   Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 February 2004. 
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As mentioned already, in the Recommendation on a new notion of media the Committee of Ministers 
has released a non-ehaustive series of indicators on how to discern what constitutes professional 
media activities. The Court has further specied that, if an individual classies as a professional jour-
nalist, this qualication carries ie epiiiie than those born by ordinary individuals. This 
principle has been epressed and conrmed on a number of times and includes obligations such as 
“acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide “reliable and precise” information 
in accordance with the ethics of journalism”51; it has been reiterated at last in a recent ruling where 
its link with the advent of online journalism is discussed. The Court has conceded that “in a world 
in which the individual is confronted with vast quantities of information circulated via traditional 
and electronic media and involving an ever-growing number of players, monitoring compliance with 
journalistic ethics takes on added importance”52; most notably however, the ruling does not call for 
dierent or stricter standards to apply to electronic media, but rather the opposite – the rise of new 
means for distribution calls for standards of good journalism to be appied iza iepec
ie  e edi chosen. 
To conrm this view, a later ruling suggests that obligations that follow from the qualication as a 
journalist, such as the duty to verify the truthfulness of the facts alleged in a story, are not waived 
or lowered as a consequence of the use of a non-traditional technology or methodology for the dis-
semination of content53. Furthermore, the professional standards apply irrespectively of whether a 
journalist is disseminating content through professional means  e.g. the newspaper they work for or 
a personal, non-professional outlet e.g. the journalist’s personal Twitter account54. In this respect, the 
Court has thus seemingly operated in the direction of a ecicaea appac, which 
attaches specic obligations to the personal qualications of the author or disseminator of the con-
tent, irrespectively of the medium of choice. 
However, parallel to this, the specicities of technology can also be taken into account and regulatory 
responses should be proportionate to this. In a ruling concerning the reproduction of material from 
the Internet by the press the Court armed that, on the one hand, national policy-makers could 
legitimately provide for dierent policies concerning the reproduction of materials from the press 
or from the Internet. One the other hand, the republication from the Internet by media which is ob-
servant of professional standards should also receive adequate protection.55 In the ruling at stake, a 
local newspaper had republished an allegedly defamatory letter originally found on a news website 
and was then convicted before the local courts. The lack in the national law of suciently specic 
provisions to grant the right to republish libel from the Internet, as it is instead the case in regards of 
other media, had deprived the defendants of the corresponding defence. The European Court found 
instead that the journalists had acted in respect of professional standards and considered the ack 
 Ieepecic ea pii, in the specic case, to be unlawful since it was impinging on 
Art 10. The Court conceded that providing for dierent regulatory approaches in respect of dierent 
technologies would be, as a matter of principle, perfectly ne, although in this specic circumstance 
51.   ECtHR, Stoll v. Switzerland, application no. 69698/01, 10 December 2007, 103.
52.   Ibid., 104.
53.   ECtHR, Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, application no. 34147/06, 21 September 2010.
54.   ECtHR, Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, application no. 40984/07, 22 April 2010.
55.   ECtHR, Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, application no. 33014/05, 5 May 2011.
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the Court considered that the lack of eplicit provisions was diminishing, rather than strengthening 
freedom of speech, especially since the lack of eplicit provisions made it dicult for the media oper-
ators to foresee the possibility of receiving penalties as consequences of their behavior.
The regulatory system resulting from the combination of such principles and rulings could be summed 
up as follows: eercise of freedom of speech carries specic responsibilities not to infringe rights of 
others. In today’s environment, state authorities must operate sensibly and carefully to discern those 
who disseminate content on a professional capacity from those who operate as private individuals. 
Standards of responsibility epected from professionals can be higher, whereas the same standards 
cannot be epected from non-professional Internet users, such as those who post messages in the 
comment sections of online newspapers or blogs, or Youtube users – who as a result cannot be held 
liable to the same standards as journalists and epected to meet analogous levels of accuracy, ethics 
and deontological standards.
The technological means used to transmit the message do not alter this main distinction, meaning 
that journalists will still be held liable by their professional standards whether they use a professional 
or a personal outlet to communicate their content. However, courts and decision-makers are also 
recommended to take into account the specic impact and outreach of the medium of choice of 
the alleged wrongdoers. This task can prove dicult, especially for courts called to assess lawsuit on 
individual basis; whereas digital technologies by no doubt oer chances for ordinary users to have 
their voices heard in ways that were simply unthinkable a few years ago, the eective readership of 
each allegedly defamatory or harmful content should be assessed specically and on a case-by-case 
basis, rather than assuming a blanket impact sparked by all online content in reason of the technol-
ogy used. From their end, law-makers and regulators are under a positive obligation to provide for 
suitable legal frameworks that, while taking into account the specicities of each medium, enhance 
– rather than stie – freedom of epression and of the media. 
1.2.2. Defamation and criminal charges
The use of criminal defamation laws as a way to “harass undesired critics” was also condemned in the 
Recommendation on Freedom of expression and information in the media in Europe.56 The strong need 
to align national laws to international standards and – in particular – decriminalise defamation is the 
main focus of two dedicated instruments, the Resolution 1577 2007 and Recommendation 1814 
2007, both entitled Towards decriminalisation of defamation.57 Both the Resolution and the Recom-
mendation acknowledge that the protection of the reputation and rights of others are legitimate 
aims to be pursued by national law-makers, although defamation laws need to be phrased and ap-
plied narrowly because of the potential threats to freedom of epression resulting from misuses or 
abuses of such laws. Other bodies of the CoE have similarly stressed the need to ece ciia 
peci  deaai on a number of occasions: most recently, the Parliamentary Assembly in 
the Recommendation on respect for media freedom58.
56.   Rec 1506 (2001), adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 24 April 2001.
57.   Res 1577 (2007), adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 4 October 2007; Rec 1814 (2007), adopted by the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 4 October 2007. 
58.   Rec 1897 (2010), adopted on 27 January 2010.
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The ECtHR has been thus far reluctant to nd the criminalization of defamation straightforwardly 
incompatible with Art 10; however, the case-law has developed through the last few years to narrow 
down progressively the scope of acceptable penalties, in practice reaching a similar result. The Court 
has mostly operated on the grounds of ppiai and the notion of “cii eec” , i.e. the 
risk of stiing freedom of speech that the sole eistence of aggravating penalties implicitly sparks, 
because of the pressure they eert on journalists, media operators and common citizens at large. In 
a case involving the author of a scientic publication who had criticized the validity of the eisting 
literature in her eld the Court argued more eplicitly that even the very eistence of the possibility 
of prison terms for cases of “common defamation” results automatically in a disproportionate chilling 
eect59. It is worth mentioning, however, that the issue of proportionality has also emerged from a 
number of cases concerning cii pecia aci, with the Court quashing “disproportionately 
large” sanctions decided by national courts.60
1.2.3. The liability of Internet Service Providers
One of the most stringent questions of the last few years concerns the liability of Internet Service Pro-
viders ISPs. Typically, an ISP is a company that provide a service allowing private or commercial users 
to undertake an activity online – ranging from access to the Internet itself to the use of more specic 
features such as VoIP, email, web-hosting or le-sharing. The denition is evidently broad and capable 
to include subjects undertaking signicantly dierent activities. The scattered landscape that results 
from a plethora of dierent phenomena included under the same umbrella-term concurs to create 
the current confusion as to the legal implications and responsibilities of ISPs for the posting of illegal 
content on the Internet.
The issue of ISP liability is again a case of digital technologies altering the scope and magnitude of 
dynamics of defamation law consolidated in the analogue world and now challenged by the chang-
es in technology. Publishers of print publications such as books, magazines and newspapers have 
traditionally been held liable along with the material authors of the defamatory content – often for 
their larger nancial capacities to pay damages back, compared to the authors. The pressing issue 
of these days is thus whether ISPs could be assimilated to publishers – and held liable for dierent 
wrongdoings committed by third parties through the means of the services the ISPs provide – in the 
online environment. 
Obviously, ISPs could only be assimilated to publishers in case they retain a signicant degree of ed-
itorial control on the published content; central to question on the liability of ISPs is thus the degree 
of editorial control they retain on the content uploaded onto the platforms they operate. Between 
the two etremes of full and no control, a larger grey area of partial for instance, on the time some 
content will remain visible to users or potential control spurs debates and scattered approaches. 
Within the CoE system, a mied approach to ISP liability has emerged thus far. As a matter of general 
principle, the orientation is towards a iied deee  iaii. Principle 6 of the Declaration on 
Freedom of Communication on the Internet provides that, apart from not being imposed to monitor In-
59.   ECtHR, Azevedo v. Portugal, application no. 20620/04, 27 March 2008, 33.
60.   Cf. ECtHR, Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, application no. 18139/91, 13 July 1995; Maronek v. Slovakia, application no. 32686/96), 
19 April 2001; Pakdemirli v. Turkey, application no. 35839/97, 22 February 2005.
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ternet content and actively seeking for evidence of illegal activities, ISPs should neither be held liable 
for content they help to transmit or provide access to. However, ISPs could be held co-responsible, 
along with the materials’ authors of the wrongdoing, only if, in the case they store third-party content 
and they are made aware of the illegality of such content, they do not take appropriate measures 
to remove of disable access to it. Under the CoE’s graduated and dierentiated approach, however, 
reliance on such privileged liability regime requires that actors are qualied as performing intermedi-
ary or auiliary activity “passive” contrary to media actors “active”. As it was referred to above, the 
CoE formulated a set of indicators to help discern whether a new communication service should be 
regarded as a media outlet and consequently regulated as such Cf. infra 1.1.1..
The Court has thus far had only few chances to elaborate on the principle distinction between actors 
identied as media or as performing an intermediary or auiliary activity. In a rst case, the Court 
declared inadmissible the application of the two co-founder of a le-sharing website, convicted by 
Swedish domestic courts for breach of copyright; the Court acknowledged that the convictions rep-
resented a possible interference with Art 10, although also conceded that the matter at stake – copy-
right – left to state authorities a wider margin of appreciation than in the case of political speech.61 
It follows from this decision that state authorities enjoy a lesser degree of margin of appreciation in 
asserting ISP liability against competing rights and interests when on the opposite of the scale is an 
interest of the utmost relevance such as political speech and public interest matters.
The Del judgement62
In Del v Estonia, the applicant company is one of the largest news portals on the Internet in Estonia 
which also provides a function below its articles where users could upload and view comments. The 
comments which were uploaded automatically and not edited or moderated were subject to a sys-
tem of notice-and-take-down, automated ltering for obscene words in addition to the possibility to 
directly notify the provider about defamatory content which would then remove this comment. The 
website claried that comments did not reect its editorial opinion and it laid down “Rules of com-
ment”. In January 2006, the Del news portal published an article about a ferry company destroying 
ice roads between the mainland and islands. This article received a fair amount of comments by 
users out of which 20 contained personal threats and highly oensive language directed against the 
owner of the ferry company. On the day Del received notice about the infringing comment -- about 
si weeks after the publication -- these comments were deleted. Following court decisions of lower 
courts, in 2009, the Supreme Court decided that Dele is liable under the Obligations Act and that 
its liability was not ecluded under the Information Society Services Act. The Court argues that Del 
is not merely an intermediary service but has an economic interest in the posting of comments and 
has control over the comment environment. Del subsequently applied to the ECtHR.
61.   ECtHR, Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v Sweden, application no. 40397/12, 19 February 2013.
62.   ECtHR, Delǳ AS v. Estonia, application no. 64569/09, 18 March 2015.
Co mpar at ive st udy o f  best  eu r o pean  pr aCt iCes o f  o n l in e Co n t en t  r egu l at io n28
The ECtHR held the defendant – an Internet news portal – responsible for comments posted by third 
parties in the section below an article concerning a matter of “a certain degree of public interest”.63 
Hereby, the Court considers that “because of the particular nature of the Internet, the “duties and 
responsibilities” that are to be conferred on an Internet news portal for the purposes of Art. 10 may 
dier to some degree from those of a traditional publisher, as regards third-party content.”64 The 
Court focused on the activity undertaken by the defendant, which included being “engaged in jour-
nalistic activities and … opening up of a comment space [which] formed part of the news portal”: 
such activities contributed towards the classication of the defendant as an “acie ieedia” 
– a denition in which the attribution of playing an active role in facilitating the posting of unlawful 
third-party comments played a central role in the conviction.
Notably, the Court qualied Del as a “professional”65 publisher – thus stressing the fact that, by 
operating in such capacity, it was under a heightened responsibility to know the law and abide by it 
– possibily by even seeking professional advice. As in the case of Perrin and the denition of the rel-
evant jurisdiction thus, the personal qualication of the defendant turns relevant. It remains unclear 
at present state whether the same degree of liability could be imposed on an ISP which – although 
providing its services on a remunerative basis – could not be considered to also eert publishing 
activities by the same standards of professionalism.
It also needs to be stressed further that the Court engaged again in the distinction between the type 
of wrongdoing perpetrated by the comments at stake. Whereas the denition of the comments as 
defamatory stems from the line of reasoning adopted by the domestic courts, the ECtHR elaborates 
further on their nature and, while regretting that the qualication of the comments operated by the 
domestic courts “remains murky”, insists at length on the seeming hateful and anti-Semitic nature 
of such comments. The Grand Chamber eplicitly observed, in this respect, that “what is really trou-
bling here is never spelled out: that some of the comments are racist”66, seemingly relinquishing the 
classication of the comments as defamatory – as originally operated by the domestic courts – and 
re-classifying them as a dierent type of wrongdoing, one that involves a dierent degree of severity 
and criminal relevance.
The qualication of the comments as tantamount to hate speech and incitation to violence has 
played a fundamental role leading towards the Court’s decision. As a result of such qualication, the 
possible interference with free speech has had to be assessed against a higher threshold – the e-
tremely severe harm suered by the possible victim of the wrongdoer – and this, together with the 
circumstance that the penalty imposed on the portal had been lenient enough for it not to change its 
business model has made the Court conclude that the interference was proportionate67. The balance 
63.   Ibid., para. 12-13.
64.   Ibid. para. 13.
65.   Ibid., para. 129.
66.   Ibid., para. 12-13.
67.   Ibid., para. 161. 
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with the harm suered by the targets of the violent comments has, similarly, led the Court to consider 
that, in such specic circumstance, it would not be disproportionate to request the portal to monitor 
the content posted through its service; however, given the dierent individual rights at stake, this 
does not suggest that a  similar request could be considered lawful if any less signicant breach of a 
third party’s fundamental right was at stake68.
The decision has been perhaps one of the most controversial of the latest few years; the dissenting 
opinions warn against the risk of imposing ecessive duties to monitor third parties’ online content 
on ISPs for its potentially disruptive eect on free speech online;  for this reason, there should be no 
“blanket prior restraints” in the form of epecting ISPs to police the Internet 24/769. On the contrary, 
any duties imposed on ISPs should result from a careful assessment of the dierent interests at stake 
to help assess the “appropriate level of care”70 required in any practical circumstance, on a case-by-
case approach.
The Del judgment thus contributes to better delineate the landscape of intermediaries’ liability un-
der the ECHR system as follows: ISPs ought to be considered generally not responsible for wrongdo-
ings committed by third parties using their services, however partial eceptions to this principle can 
apply when circumstances occur such as:
− in regards of the activities undertaken by the intermediaries, these should amount to actively 
facilitating the perpetration of wrongdoings by others, hence going farther than just oering 
the technical means or platforms to the wrongdoers. Furthermore, the scope of the activities 
should be so far-reaching to trespass the boundaries of what is normally regarded as an in-
termediary’s role but rather constitutes a journalistic activity; because of such redenition, 
stricter standards apply.
− In regards of the type of wrongdoing perpetrated, elements of criminal relevance should like-
ly be present. 
In the Del decision, both these circumstances were found by the Court, leading to the decision to 
uphold the conviction of the defendant. At present time, it remains unclear, yet no indications in this 
sense are available, that a similar decision in lack of either of those two elements would be similarly 
found to be compatible with the ECHR.
1.3 o ie ce i adiia ii  ie ad pace
The very nature of information posted on the Internet is challenging a series of assumptions on the 
circulation and consumption of news and online content in general. Internet websites are typically 
accessible over the world irrespective of the place where the author is located and even of the pub-
lic the content was originally aimed to. Further to this, such information can normally be easily and 
promptly retrieved even after a signicant number of years since they were originally posted; it is to-
day common practice for the large majority of online newspapers and magazines to make the whole 
or almost collection of published articles available to readers through archives. Such collections 
68.   Ibid., para. 158.
69.   Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sajo and Tsotsoria, ibid, para. 33. 
70.   Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sajo and Tsotsoria, ibid., para. 43.
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often date back of several decades and are potentially, if technology assists, to remain online as long 
as the media outlet stays in business and even afterwards, if the host does not take the content down. 
As a result, safe language barriers the advent of the Internet is making a unprecedented amount in-
formation available to – potentially – everybody across the planet blurring traditional limits of time 
and space. This makes questions about jurisdiction and limitation period all the more urgent.
1.3.1. The multiple publication rule
o ie acie are a disputed matter for the reason they make news stories and online content in 
general accessible indeterminately after the original publication, potentially forever. Due to the tech-
nical means to retrieve webpages online, each and every time an Internet user accesses a webpage 
from their device, the information stored in a server is downloaded to such device in order to allow 
the user to visualize the content on their screen. 
The main question at stake is whether such technical operation amounts to a new publication of the 
same content – if this was the case, a new iiai peid  ie aci as provided by the na-
tional law would run again from each moment the content is accessed on an individual device. The 
principle is known as “multiple publication rule” and is common in the British jurisdiction; in brief, it 
entails that “each individual publication of a libel gives rise to a separate cause of action, subject to 
its own limitation period”.71 This approach is far from being universally adopted across national legal 
systems as other options are similarly widespread and viable; for instance, the USA has traditionally 
adopted the opposite “single publication rule”, which entails that only one action can be brought, in 
only one jurisdiction, and the limitation period runs from the time of the rst publication irrespec-
tively of other reprints, further editions, broadcastings could occur afterwards. In the Internet envi-
ronment, this means that the limitation periods runs once from the original uploading of the content, 
irrespectively of how many times, and when, such content is then downloaded by individual users.
Under the multiple publication rule, lawsuits led possibly years after the original publication could 
put media companies, as defendants, in dicult situations and thus spark a result comparable to 
a chilling eect. Such was the argumentation of the defendant – the British newspaper Times – in 
a recent case72; the ECtHR seemingly opted for a multiple publication rule similar to the UK model, 
thus allowing for a media company to be sued multiple times over time – including past the original 
limitation period following the rst publication. The Court however conceded that online archives 
are themselves protected by the right to freedom of speech and has thus envisaged ways for media 
outlets to be eempt from liability for the content of their archives. Typically, attaching a warning no-
tice to archive copies of knowingly defamatory material would suce to eclude the media’s liability; 
in any case, media outlets can not be epected to remove their archives altogether. It is also worth 
mentioning that the Court has seemingly devised in this decision a aaci e  iiae the 
potentially disruptive eects of a full and blanket application of the multiple publication rule: the two 
lawsuits at stake with the case had followed shortly one another and the second in particular was 
led when the rst trial was still ongoing; it was thus unlikely that the defendant’s chances to defend 
themselves appropriately were seriously impaired in the second lawsuit. However, the Court has con-
71.   ECtHR, Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd, [2002] QB 783.
72.   ECtHR, Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos. 1 and 2) v The United Kingdom, applications 3002/03 and 23676/03, 10 March 2009.
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ceded that “libel proceedings brought against a newspaper after a signicant lapse of time may well, 
in the absence of eceptional circumstances, give rise to a disproportionate interference with press 
freedom under Art. 10.”73 While accepting the multiple publication rule, the Court has thus contetu-
ally ecluded that media outlets could keep being sued for an indeterminate period of time. National 
legislators should therefore balance “the protection of the right to freedom of epression enjoyed 
by the press … against the rights of individuals to protect their reputations and, where necessary, to 
have access to a court in order to do so [and thus] set a limitation period which is appropriate and … 
provide for any cases in which an eception to the prescribed limitation period may be permitted”.74
1.3.2. Jurisdiction
The geographical seamless nature of the technologies raises further questions arise, such as where 
the alleged defamation actually took place, what would be the applicable law and which national 
court would have jurisdiction on the case. Questions of jurisdictions have been dealt with by the 
ECtHR on a number of occasions well before the advent of the Internet – which conversely has only 
added a further layer of compleity to the ongoing issue. Art. 1 of the ECHR provides indeed that 
the Member States should “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” of 
the ECHR. The relevant ECtHR case-law has now long established that relevant criteria to identify the 
reach on national jurisdictions – and thus of the State’s obligation to grant claimants access to domes-
tic tribunals – include the ei i.e. not only citizens but only residents and any individuals on the 
soil should be given access and eecie c of State authorities on otherwise foreign territories. 
The case-law of the ECtHR has been seen to move, in the latest few years, from a strictly territori-
al-centred approach75 towards a more comprehensive approach that also takes into account individ-
ual circumstances as elements of connection76. In one leading decision,77 the Court accepted British 
jurisdiction in a case where the applicant was a French national based in the UK where he had been 
convicted for publishing obscene material on a webpage operated by a US-based Internet company. 
The content of the webpage, of an obscene nature according to the British law, was instead lawful 
according to the US law. The Court however accepted the defendant’s residence in combination with 
the acceiii  e eie at stake within the UK as sucient criteria for that state to eert its 
jurisdiction on the webpage, as opposed to the place of establishment of the company running the 
website. The Perrin ruling is the most recent and evident eample of personal connection elements 
becoming central features of Internet jurisdiction; what is further relevant is that by applying such 
personal connection, the courts in the domestic proceedings were able to apply the British aia 
aie ce eai to a US-based website.
In this sense, the decision seems to dier signicantly from the line of reasoning adopted in an earlier 
73.   Ibid., 48. 
74.   Ibid., 46. 
75.   Cf. ECtHR, Bankovic & Others v Belgium & Others, application no. 52207/99, 12 December 2001.
76.   Cf. . ECtHR, Issa and Others v Turkey, application no. 31821/96, 16 November 2004; Ocalan v Turkey, application no. 46221/99, 12 May 2005; 
Medvedyev and Others v France, application no. 3394/03, 29 March 2010; Al Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom, application no. 55721/07, 7 
July 2011.
77.   . ECtHR, Perrin v. the United Kingdom, application no.5446/03, 18 October 2005.
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decision78 when the Court found no jurisdictional links between the applicants based in Morocco 
and a paper publication that had taken place in Denmark. Along with personal connection elements, 
the outreach and accessibility of online publications thus seems to oer a reason to epand national 
jurisdictions on online publications. However, it ought to be stressed that in Perrin the ECtHR con-
sidered signicant the fact the applicant was operating in a professional capacity, a circumstance 
that required a “high degree of caution” in the pursuit of his activities – ostensibly higher than what 
could be epected from an ordinary Internet user acting in their private capacity –, such as taking 
into account the laws of the country where his activities took place.  It is unclear at present, although 
possibly unlikely, that the same amount of familiarity and awareness of a foreign legal system and its 
substantive laws could be epected from an individual neither resident in the country eercising its 
jurisdiction, nor operating in a professional capacity. The eective signicance of the apparently new-
ly devised element of connection of the availability of a website in a country will need to be tested 
further in future cases. 
However, the Recommendation on a new notion of media79 recalls the need to provide for appro-
priate measures to cope with the “accumulated or multiplied impact” that today’s media can gener-
ate compared to traditional analogue media; in particular, eplicit reference is made to the need to 
“apportion responsibility” in case of harm made to third-party rights. National legislators and courts 
should thus operate with particular care and tackle questions of jurisdiction for online activities; pro-
portionality remains, in this eld, a paramount principle.
1.3.3. Libel tourism
The strengthening of objective elements of connection such as the country of residence of the de-
fendant taps in a line of reasoning based on the need to avoid libel tourism, i.e. publishers possibly 
seeking to establish their operations in countries were prosecution would be dicult to pursue, in an 
attempt to escape their responsibilities. Libel tourism is indeed becoming an issue of major concern 
at the global level. The Steering Committee on Media and Communication Services, in the aftermath 
of the Times Newspapers (Nos. 1 and 2) decision, has remarked how in the current scenario “libel tour-
ism is an issue of growing concern for Council of Europe member states as it challenges a number of 
essential rights protected by the Convention such as Art. 10 Freedom of epression, Art. 6 Right to 
a fair trial and Art. 8 Right to respect for private and family life80” and thus “the prevention of libel 
tourism should be part of the reform of the legislation on libel/defamation in member states in order 
to ensure better protection of the freedom of epression and information within a system that strikes 
a balance between competing human rights.81” Measures recommended by the Steering Committee 
include, at the domestic level, increasing the possibilities of recognition of foreign judgments across 
jurisdictions and strengthening the principle of proportionality of damages in defamation cases.  
78.   ECtHR, El Mahi and Others v Denmark, Application no. 5853/06, 11/12/2006.
79.   Ibid., para. 66.
80.   Steering Committee on the Media and New Communication Services, ‘Draft declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the desirability of 
international standards dealing with forum shopping in respect of defamation, “libel tourism”, to ensure freedom of expression’, CDMC(2011)018Rev8, 
2012, p. 3.
81.   Ibid., 4. 
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1.4. A paicipa Iee  a: e e  e ad ceai
As noted above, the Coe has already acknowledged that the rise of the Internet and digital technol-
ogies in general has modied signicantly the chains of production of media content, with the rele-
vant industries now being more scattered and diversied than ever. Since the advent of Web 2.0, i.e. 
digital technologies that allow professional as well as non-professional Internet users to produce and 
disseminate content to large audiences, disintermediation has become perhaps the most notable 
phenomenon that has altered the modes of media production. The changing nature of media indus-
tries is reected in the regulatory approach recommended by CoE Principles, namely the appreciation 
for e ad ceai and all measures that “foster and encourage” widespread access to and 
paicipai in Internet communication and information services Principle 4 on the one side, and 
conversely on the other side the disfavour towards forms of prior state control through blocking or 
ltering measures Principle 3 or licensing schemes to run individual websites Principle 4. 
As noted above, the fact that state regulation is at high risk of resulting in unduly interference with 
media freedom is nothing new – and indeed media self-regulation has emerged as a successful reg-
ulatory model well before the Internet era; within the contemporary contet however, the model 
seems all the more suitable to address the emerging and pressing issues of the transnational nature 
of the Internet and the multiplication of stakeholders in the regulated environment, as it was stressed 
for instance at the 5th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy “The Information So-
ciety: a challenge for Europe”82. The more recent Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to 
member states on promoting freedom of epression and information in the new information and 
communications environment83 has conrmed the main pillars of this approach: epee  
piae e, acceiii  ICt  iace ad iai, ieaia c a
dad  e ce ceai ad cpeai a akede are among the lines of 
action that the Committee of Ministers has recommended to the Member States. 
The Council of Europe has further stressed on numerous occasions the need to embrace openness 
in policy- and law-making processes and thus relevant stakeholders, such as the private sector and 
the civil society should be consulted and their opinion taken in account as much as possible while 
amending or passing new ones. The Council itself has indeed on several occasions opened up to 
consultation from representatives of various sectors of the civil society – such as NGOs –, the private 
sector – such as professional media operators –, and the public sector – such as members of the 
judiciary and regulatory authorities. Recent eamples include the regional Conference on defama-
tion and freedom of epression held in Strasbourg on 17-18 October 2002 which brought toghether 
members of the judiciary, practicing lawyers and journalists to discuss regulatory issues regarding 
defamation and alternative measure to litigation such as mediation, and the need to align national 
laws to the standards of the Council of Europe, in particular the eclusion of special substantive and/
or procedural defences for State representatives84 and the Luembourg conference on freedom of 
82.   Cf. the resulting Action Plan for the promotion of freedom of expression and information at the pan-European level within the framework of the 
Information Society (Thessaloniki, 11-12 December 1997): “Action in the area of self-regulation: To encourage, in particular at the transnational level, 
self-regulation by providers and operators of the new communications and information services, especially content providers, in the form of codes of 
conduct or other measures, with a view to ensuring respect for human rights and human dignity, the protection of minors and democratic values, as well 
as the credibility of the media themselves.” 
83.   CM/Rec(2007)11, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 26 September 2007. 
84.   Cf. Defamation and Freedom of Expression – Selected documents. H/ATCM (2003) 1. Media Division Directorate General of Human, 2003.
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epression and the protection of human rights.85 On this occasion, the risk of misplaced legal rules 
jeopardizing freedom of the media and the struggle to balance conicting individual rights were 
stressed again.86 The conference concluded with the adoption of a draft law on the freedom of the 
media which remarked again the need not to provide special measure to protect public ocials87 and 
the eclusion of criminal liability for publishers88.
The importance of fostering self-regulation in the media sphere has been also stressed by the ECtHR 
on a few other occasions89, with eplicit references to the relevant CoE instruments. The Coe has thus 
delivered a clear and eplicit message that the Internet should be an open and collaborative environ-
ment; cooperation as an operational principle should etend to the process of rule-making as well. In 
light of this, national governments and lawmakers should be wary of the intrinsic risk to overregulate 
the digital media sphere that lies deep in any attempt to provide for regulation from top-down with-
out the involvement of relevant stakeholders from the private sector and the civil society.
1.5. t e peci  piac ad idei
As a matter of principle, Art 8 of the ECHR protects the right to private life - and  inter alia  pea 
daa – ad piae cepdece – including of Internet mediated communications. The state 
obligation to protect individuals’ personal data creates a comple dynamic with today’s Internet en-
vironment. ISPs and website owners are often – and increasingly – requested by public authorities 
to undertake identity checks on their users and retain for a specied period metadata about online 
communications events for purposes related to public security and the ght against online crimes. 
Whereas such are denitely legitimate aims of state authorities, the potential for such measures to 
step too far and breach the right to privacy is all too evident and problematic; while it stays undis-
85.   “The media in a democratic society: reconciling freedom of expression with the protection of human rights”: Luxembourg – 30 September – 1st 
Oct. 2002.
86.   Cf. Report of Rapporteur Aiden White, Secretary General of the International Federation of Journalists, ‘Medias in a Democratic Society: Is There a 
Possible Balance Between the Freedom of Expression and the Protection of Human Rights’. 
87.   The suggested wording reads as: “Libel, defamation and insults towards any constituted body shall be liable to the same penalties as libel, defama-
tion and insults towards individuals.”
88.   The suggested wording reads as: 
“Section 1. Criminal liability
Art.20. Liability for oǲenses committed through the media shall lie with the publisher or his or her assistants, as principal authors.
Art.21. Article 443 of the Criminal Code shall be supplemented by a new sub-paragraph 2, worded as follows:
“2. Neither shall the publisher or an assistant be guilty of libel or defamation if:
1) in cases where the law allows for proof of the facts, such proof is not provided, but the publisher or assistant, subject to having taken due care, show 
that they had good reason to believe that the facts reported were true and that there was a preponderant public interest in the disputed information 
being known;
2. it occurs during a live broadcast, provided that: 
a) due care has been taken, and 
b) the identity of the person uttering the oǲending words either is apparent from the information disclosed, or may be disclosed to anyone on request;
3. the words are contained in an accurate quotation of another person, provided that: 
a) the quotation is clearly identiǳed, and 
b) the identity of the author of the quoted words either is apparent from the information disclosed or may be revealed to anyone on request, and 
c) disclosure of the quotation to the public is justiǳed by a preponderant public interest in the quoted words being known.
Section 2. Civil liability
Art.22. The publisher and his or her assistants shall be jointly liable for the reparation of all damage caused by the public release of a publication, which 
shall be ordered payable to third parties on the basis of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code.”
89.   Cf. ECtHR, Mosley v. the United Kingdom, application no. no. 48009/08, 10 May 2011, 55-61; Delǳ AS v. Estonia, application no. 64569/09, 18 
March 2015, 39.
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puted that only a thin line separates legitimate forms of scrutiny of Internet trac from unlawful 
intrusions, where such line should be drown remains unclear. It is particularly disputable whether the 
right to privacy amounts to a i  eai ai ie. A blanket prohibition in such sense 
does not certainly operate, since the Court has recently found compatible with the Convention an 
obligation imposed on an ISP to disclose the identity of the author of an advertisement concerning 
the facilitation of a minor’s se acts;90 however, the ruling indicates a need to construct the balancing 
test taking into account the severity of the wrongdoing and the result of the test could be dierent 
whereas the anonymous wrongdoer was charged with a criminal accusation of procuring an under-
age prostitute as opposed to the case of a less aggravating, typically civil charge such as defamation. 
Such orientation would be in line with the direction drawn by the Committee of Ministers in the Dec-
laration on freedom of communication on the Internet: principle 7 requires member states to “respect 
the will of users of the Internet not to disclose their identity”, ecept for the purpose of investigat-
ing criminal acts. A similar position has been taken more recently by the Parliamentary Assembly in 
the Resolution on Improving user protection and security in cyberspace.91 Needless to say, the com-
bined result of such indications along with the strong disfavor towards criminalization of defamation 
strongly hints at the incompatibility with the Convention of provisions allowing state authorities to 
obtain from ISPs information disclosing the personal identities of otherwise anonymous authors of 
defamatory Internet content. Such an approach is also best compatible with the approach of the 
ECtHR to data retention in a more general perspective; national legislation authorizing the retention 
of personal data referring to unsuspicious, suspected but not convicted, and convicted criminals in 
the same indiscriminate approach has been found incompatible with the Convention, notably due 
to the stigmatizing eect resulting from dierent situations being treated in the same manner.92 The 
ruling conrms once more the need to provide for dierent ways to handle private information in-
cluding rst and foremost identity, with stronger protections of individual privacy being provided in 
cases where no criminal charges are implied.
2. Eu r o PEAn  u n Io n
Within the EU legal system, the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms eplicitly provides for freedom of 
speech at Art 11, largely drawn from the eample of the equivalent Art 10 ECHR. The almost eact 
matching of the wording suggests that the appreciation of the value and importance of freedom of 
speech within the two systems EU and CoE are comparable to each other. The EU institutions have 
developed, throughout the years, their own set of standards and detailed guidance on the practical 
implementation of the theoretical principle. Interestingly enough, the similarities between the EU 
and the CoE approaches seem to greatly outnumber the dierences.
90.    ECtHR, K.U. v. Finland, application no. 2872/02, 2 December 2008.
91.   Resolution 1986 (2014) Final version, adopted on 9 April 2014. Cf. para. 6.4: “Criminal activities on or through online services must be combated 
eǲectively by the competent State authorities in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; law-abiding users have the 
right to remain anonymous, while law-infringing users must be identiǳable and criminals must be identiǳable by law-enforcement bodies subject to the 
legal safeguards required under the European Convention on Human Rights”.
92.   ECtHR, S. and Marper v the United Kingdom,  applications no. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 December 2008, 122.
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2.1. Eu  pic appac
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Aairs has recently released a Report on the EU 
Charter concerning Standard settings for media freedom across the EU93 which includes a motion for 
a EP Resolution on the same subject. The Report is revelatory of a number of principles and lines 
of action that the Parliament considers of the outmost importance in order to enhance freedom of 
speech, and oer guidance on the actions recommended to national law-makers, administrative and 
eecutive authorities, and the judiciary.
2.1.1. Open Internet, Self- and Co-Regulation
Similarly to the CoE, the EU stresses the importance of fostering pee ad paicipai i 
e ie eie, and etends this principle to the process of policy- and law-making, as 
recommended by the CoE as well. The Committee has stressed indeed how independent self- and 
co-regulatory measures can play “an important role to play in ensuring media freedom” and should 
be thus encouraged at the supranational as well as at the national level. The Report stresses how the 
independence, impartiality and transparency of e ad cea die should be carefully 
monitored and implemented; furthermore, independence should be insured from both State and 
commercial inuences94. 
More in detail, the Report cites as viable eamples of such regulatory arrangements the likes of edi
ia cae ad iea cde  cdc, and stresses the need to protect the independence 
of journalists from possible source of unduly inuence such as editors, publishers or owners, political 
or economic lobbies or other interest groups95. As a further sign of the strong conformity of the EU 
guidelines with the CoE orientation, the Report recommends to national authorities the “strict appli-
cation of European Court of Human Rights case-law in this area”96.  
2.1.2. The protection of media operators
A number of principles and recommendations included in the Report focus specically on the rel-
evance of journalistic professions – ieiaie jai in particular – and the need for state 
authorities to provide for best suitable legal frameworks to protect and safeguard their indispensable 
role within the society. Similar to the guidelines of the CoE, the Report also recalls the fundamental 
role of professional responsibilities and the duty for professional media operators to cp i 
eica adad and recommends the provision of professional training by media associations and 
unions97. Such standards should include “the obligation to indicate a dierence between facts and 
opinions in reporting, the necessity of accuracy, impartiality and objectivity, respect for people’s pri-
vacy, the duty to correct misinformation and the right of reply”, and it is a specic duty pending on 
state authorities to make sure that the relevant industries would establish independent media regu-
93.   Report on the EU Charter: standard settings for media freedom across the EU (2011/2246(INI)), A7-0117/2013, adopted by the plenary sitting of 
the European Parliament on 25 March 2013. 
94.   Ibid., para. 9.
95.   Ibid., para. 18.
96.   Ibid., para. 20.
97.   Ibid., para. 21.
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latory bodies to provide for adequate regulatory measures in this sense98. 
In terms of safeguards to journalistic freedom, the Report calls for the deciiaizai  deaa
i and points at the disruptive eect generated by a variety of practices such as “pressures, violence 
and harassment … eerted on journalists”99. 
Attention is also paid to dia ciize’ cicai i in the contet of digital technolo-
gies. The Report includes a strong endorsement in favour of net neutrality and epresses concern for 
state authorities’ attempts at requiring registration or authorization to access online content, as well 
as at imposing curbing legal provisions in an attempt to halt illegal behaviours. 
2.1.3. A focus on digital technologies
Even more recently, the Council has adopted the EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expres-
sion Online and Oine100. As the title suggests, the Guidelines take a broader approach to the issue 
of free speech in the contemporary world and take into account the dierent ways in which digital 
technologies have altered the ow of information, thus considering also the case of non-professional 
media operators. Throughout the document, the strong endorsement of the CoE standards as the 
best practice that national authorities are recommended to follow is, again, made eplicit on a num-
ber of occasions101. 
Legal safeguards should cover both professionals and “‘’citizen journalists’’, bloggers, social media 
activists and human rights defenders, who use new media to reach a mass audience”102, as well as 
“media actors, NGOs and social media personalities”103. The orientation stems from the preliminary 
observation that the advent of digital technologies has altered the dynamics of production and de-
livery of content and enabled individuals to reach out wide audiences and play a fundamental role 
in democratic debates and decision-making processes. The Guidelines thus consider that, with the 
scope of technological means epanding and widening the process the boundaries of the public 
sphere, the cpe  a i d epad accordingly and cover content disseminated 
both online and oine104. 
It is also noteworthy to observe how the Guidelines consider that Member States are under a piie 
iai to provide for suitable legal frameworks to implement such rights105.  
The Guidelines also provide an assessment of what constitutes a ea  eed  peec. Again, 
the Guidelines take a particularly broad and comprehensive approach to the matter, considering that 
not only statutory laws, but also any measure resulting in censorship or self-censorship e.g. “criminal, 
nancial and administrative sanctions on the eercise of freedom of opinion and epression, in viola-
98.   Ibid., para. 24.
99.   Ibid., para. 25.
100.   Adopted at the Foreign Aǲairs Council meeting in Brussels, 12 May 2014.
101.   Ibid., para. 61. 
102.   EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and OǶine, para. 5. 
103.   Ibid., para. 31.
104.   Ibid., para. 6, 16 and 35.
105.   Ibid., para. 24 and 35. 
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tion of international human rights law”106; “arbitrary attacks, indiscriminate abuse of criminal and civil 
proceedings, defamation campaigns”107 and call for the member states’ law-makers to make sure the 
national legal frameworks are in line with such requirements.  
The Annex to the Guidelines recommends some more specic action to be taken by national law-mak-
ers. In detail, such recommendations include:
− Restrictions on freedom of epression must be provided by law, and abide by international 
human rights law and strict tests of necessity and proportionality, in order to avoid inconsis-
tent and abusive application of legislation which in turn could spark media’s self-censorship;
− Taking advantage of defamation laws as a tool to censor criticism amounts to a misuse of such 
laws, in particular when they entail imprisonment or severe criminal or civil sanctions;
− Interference on Internet usage, such as blocking, slowing down, degrading or discriminat-
ing against specic content or applications by operators, including when requested by law, 
should always be avoided;
− Illegal surveillance and interception of communications, as well as illegal collection of person-
al data, amount to breach of the right to privacy. Unlawful or arbitrary government or private 
company access to personal data, and Undue interference with individuals’ privacy in general, 
have a direct potential to stie free speech and should therefore be avoided.
As mentioned above already, the orientations of the EU and the CoE are signicantly similar and in 
line with each other. While this circumstance further strengthens the authority of both the sets of 
guidelines and indications, it also oers direct evidence that at the European level, irrespectively of 
which supranational institution takes the lead in arming relevant principles, a broad and horizontal 
consensus in emerging towards common sets of principles and practical ways to implement them.
2.2. Eu  eiai
Apart from policy declarations and recommendations the EU acquis covers legislation and jurispru-
dence that impacts on online content regulation in the member states. However, it should be noted 
that the eld of online content regulation is not fully harmonized and that a number of aspects are 
not inside the competence of the EU to regulate.
2.1.4. The liability of ISPs under EU law
The E-Commerce Directive eplicitly limits its scope to the provision of services on a remunerative 
basis, albeit not necessarily paid by the users who receive the service as eplained by Recital 18 of the 
Directive. Pursuant to this denition, Commercial ISPs fall under the scope of the Directive.
Several provisions in the Directive deal with the question of intermediaries’ liability. As a general prin-
ciple, ieediaie ae eeped  iaii for any wrongdoing committed by third parties 
by using the means of services they provide inasmuch as:
106.   Ibid., para. 30.
107.   Ibid., para. 31.
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− the service consists of operating and giving access to a communication network to transmit 
or store made available by third parties i.e. not by the ISP itself; 
− the nature of the service provided is merely of technical, automatic and passive nature; 
− and as a result of this the ISP has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which 
is transmitted or stored108.
Further provisions specify the cases for eclusion of liability in light of specic services that could be 
provided by ISPs. When the ISP acts as a mere conduit i.e. the ISP transmits third party’s content, 
liability is ecluded under condition that the service provider did not initiate the transmission, nor se-
lected the receiver of the transmission, nor selected or modied the information at stake109. The qual-
ication as a ee cdi is further dened as including the “automatic, intermediate and transient 
storage of the information transmitted in so far as this takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out 
the transmission in the communication network”, and the storage must be limited to the time strictly 
necessary to transmitting the content at stake110. Recital 43 helps to better understand what is meant 
by the requirement that ISPs, in order to be kept non-liable, should not modify the transmitted con-
tent: the Recital species that the ISPs are only allowed to manipulations of a technical nature, which 
do not alter the integrity of the information contained in the transmission111. 
When the ISP provides caci services i.e. they merely store information, provided by a recipient 
of the service, on a temporary basis, liability is ecluded under condition that it did not modify the 
information; it complied with conditions on access to the information, with common industry rules 
regarding the updating of the information; did not interfere with the lawful use of technology to ob-
tain data on the use of the information; and acted epeditiously to remove or to disable access to the 
information it has stored after obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the original information 
has been removed, or access to it has been disabled, or that a judicial or administrative order for such 
content to be removed or disabled has been released112. 
When the ISP acts as an  i.e. it merely stores information, provided by a recipient of the service, 
on a permanent basis, liability is ecluded if the provider was unaware of the illegal nature of the ac-
tivity facilitated or of the information stored, including facts or circumstances that made such illegal-
ity apparent, or as soon as it is made aware of such illegality, acts epeditiously to remove the illegal 
content or disable access to it113. 
In light of this, a specic d  i the information which they transmit or store is ecluded, as 
well as any blanket provision requiring them to actively to seek evidence of wrongdoings. However, 
state authorities have a choice to provide for such measures to request ISPs to communicate informa-
tion about alleged wrongdoing, and information concerning the identity of alleged wrongdoers, to 
108.   Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) Rec. 42. 
109.   Art. 12(1).
110.   Art. 12(2).
111.   Rec. 43.
112.   Art. 13(1).
113.   Art. 14 (1-2).
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the competent authorities on their request114.  The specic boundaries of such possibility are further 
dened in the Directive: those entail the possibility for national law-makers to authorize courts to 
provide for the service providers to terminate or prevent an infringement, even when those oper-
ate as mere conduits115 or providers of caching116 or hosting117 services. It is noteworthy to mention 
that, whereas these mentioned provisions grant a discretionary power to legislators to allow national 
courts to award injunctions towards ISPs,  ei i ade  daae  e peaie  e 
iped  IsP – which thus seem to be ecluded from the number of measures that courts can be 
lawfully authorized to use. 
Despite such denitory eorts, it seems that interpretative problems remain at both the national and 
the supranational level. Most of the doubts have revolved thus far on the notion of “awareness” of a 
wrongdoing by ISPs and the “promptness” of their response after being made aware of any illegalities. 
To further complicate the matter, the notion of ISP is notably broad and capable to encompass the 
provision of very services and activities; it is thus unclear whether the same notions of awareness and 
promptness should apply to all of them or if a more balanced, dierentiated approach should rather 
be adopted. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union CJEU has so far had the chance to clarify such questions, 
although to a limited etent, in a handful of cases. It has, for instance, considered that activities such 
as optimising the visual display of the content stored in their facilities amounts to taking an active role 
in the storage and delivery of the content, ecludes the possibility of unawareness and thus makes 
the ISP liable under Art 141118. However, ISPs cannot be required by law to install monitoring soft-
wares and analyse all the data stored and transmitted through their facilities119. In a more general per-
spective, the Court has repeatedly stressed the principle that, whereas payment terms and the overall 
business models cannot be a stand-alone indicator of whether a service fall under the denition of 
“information society service provider”, attention must be paid to factual hints of whether the provider 
had knowledge and/or control of the content transmitted through their facilities. In a more recent 
ruling, this was undisputedly the case of a newspaper publishing company relative to the website 
on which the online version of the newspaper was posted120. Whereas the Court considered that the 
Directive 2000/31 “does not preclude a Member State from adopting rules of civil liability for defama-
tion, applicable to information society service providers established in its territory”, liability still has to 
be assessed against said checks of previous knowledge and control of the information transmitted121.
In spite of such interpretative diculties, it clearly emerges from the joint analysis of the Directive 
and of the relevant case-law that, once more,  e Eu ad e CE e ae ieed 
ad ecdi IsP iaii a a eea e. Compared to the CoE guidelines, EU Law provides 
for more eplicit eceptions to the principle, although these have not proven to be as straightforward 
114.   Art. 15. 
115.   Art. 12(3).
116.   Art. 13(2).
117.   Art. 14(3).
118.   CJEU, C-324/09, L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others, 12 July 2011, para. 107-124.
119.   CJEU, C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV, 16 February 2012, para. 36-40. 
120.   CJEU, Sotiris Papasavvas v O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etairia Ltd and Others, C-291/13, 11 September 2014, para. 46.
121.   Ibid., para. 31-36.
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as desired, at least thus far. However, it remains clear that none of the eisting or pending decisions 
of either of the two Courts have thus far challenged the principle that ISPs should not be assumed to 
be aware of any wrongdoing, cannot be forcibly requested to police the content they help to store 
or transmit, and in lack of any actual and proven awareness of any illegality related to such content, 
should be held liable for it. 
2.1.5. The limited scope of the right of reply
The Audiovisual Media Services Directive represents a rst signicant attempt by the EU authorities to 
provide a suitable legal framework for the new technological environment in which the audiovisual 
media operate. The Directive introduces the category of on-demand audiovisual media services, i.e. 
those provided on a non-linear basis, especially on the Internet. The Directive rolls out a graduated 
system of regulation with a bottom layer that applies to all audiovisual media services and some 
dierentiated legal provisions for traditional linear and on-demand audiovisual media services re-
spectively.
The right of reply applies only to providers of linear audiovisual media services, ie. broadcasters and 
television channels. As a general consideration, the Directive states the principle that “the right of re-
ply is an appropriate legal remedy for television broadcasting and could also be applied in the on-line 
environment”122. The Directive requires national authorities to make sure that broadcasters will grant 
a ep  a eqiae eae to those whose reputation and good name have been damaged 
as a result of an assertion of incorrect facts. While carrying out such duty, the provider should not 
be faced with eaae e  cdii, nor should be given unreasonable time spans to 
comply with the request123. 
It is noteworthy to mention that, during the preparatory works that led towards the nal draft of the 
Directive, the possibility to etend such provision to on-line media was considered and discussed 
animatedly. The nal version of the tet leaves the provision conned to the broadcasting sector and 
does not alter the substance of the norm to any signicant etent compared to the previous provision 
in the Television Without Frontiers Directive. A number of technology-driven motivations are likely 
behind this choice for instance, the wider possibilities that the Internet oers to amend a dynamic 
page – as opposed to the case of a printed book or newspaper, which obviously cannot be altered 
once published; the broader access to the medium granted to all individuals, including those who 
nd themselves defamed, to publish an alternative view or perspective on the facts alleged against 
them, while it is interesting to note the further motivation that an etended right of reply would have 
a potentially disruptive eect on the uptake of Internet media at the European level and make the 
European Internet media outlets more vulnerable to their international competitors124. Such consid-
erations, originally put forward by the British representatives, could be taken into consideration by 
national authorities as they proceed to legislate on this matter.
122.   Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), 
para.. 103. 
123.   Ibid., Art 28.
124.   Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Protection of Minors and Human Dignity: Right of Reply, 2007.
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2.1.6. Information duties in the AVMS and in the E-Commerce Directives
Under the EU legal system, information duties are imposed on both ISPs and providers of audiovisual 
media services; despite the dierences in nature and scope they all share a similar rationale, consist-
ing in an attempt to provide more information to the customers of each type of service, regarding the 
nature of the providers or of the service itself. All such information duties can thus be considered an 
eample of a dierent approach taken by the EU authorities in this eld; whereas democracy-driven 
consideration are at the heart of other provisions such as protection of journalists and ordinary citi-
zens to access means of communication, the focus here is on users of electronic commerce and media 
services as consumers. All the provisions discussed below, although dierent one from another, share 
this same perspective.
A rst batch of information duties requires ISPs to provide a minimum set of information to the recip-
ients of their services, in order to make it possible for them to identify the provider. Such information 
is considered to be kept at a minimum in order to not infringe the – possibly competing – right to 
privacy. 
Pursuant to the E-Commerce Directive, information to be provided includes:
− the name of the ISP;
− its geographical address;
− its details including the electronic mail address;
− if available, the public or trade register in which the service provider is entered and his regis-
tration number;
− the particulars of the relevant supervisor authority, if applicable;
− the details of the registration to any relevant professional body, if applicable;
− the professional title and the Member State where it has been granted,
− a reference to the applicable professional rules in the Member State of establishment and the 
means to access them125.
A dierent set of rules is provided in respect of cecia cicai a cie pa  
e eice pided. In such cases, information must be available to make immediately identiable:
− the commercial communication;
− the natural or legal person on whose behalf the commercial communication is made;
− any promotional oers and the conditions thereof;
− promotional competitions or games and the conditions thereof. 
Lastly, a third set of analogous provisions is included in the AVMS Directive and focuses on providers 
of media services hence in a broad sense, encompassing both providers of linear and on-demand 
programmes. It establishes an obligation for them to provide to the public clear information on 
pip aeee – through the name, logo, symbols of the sponsor and any appropriate 
125.   E-Commerce Directive, Art 5.
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and distinctive sign. The provision evidently aims at avoiding eposing viewers to unwitting spon-
soring. To any etent, it is forbidden for tobacco products and medicine to sponsor programmes; the 
scheduling should always result from an independent editorial decision of the provider and not be 
inuence by the sponsors to any etent126.
Similar to this, pdc pacee is only allowed for cinema productions provided that viewers are 
clearly informed of the eistence of product placement; through appropriate identication of at the 
start, end, and after resuming from advertising breaks127.
2.1.7. The rights to privacy and data protection 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights CFR of the European Union provides in Art 7 for the right to 
privacy and in Art 8 for the right to the protection of personal data. The EU regulatory framework for 
data protection regulation consists of the general Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC128 and a num-
ber of sector-specic instruments, notably the e-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC129. The publication of 
personal data online, i.e. “any information relating to an identied or identiable natural person”130, 
constitutes a relevant act of personal data processing which must comply with EU data protection 
law save where this constitutes a purely personal or household activity.131 Where this is the case, the 
individual to which the personal data relates can eercise a number of rights which are provided for 
in the Data Protection Directive. Pursuant to Art 14a of the Directive the individual has the right to 
object “at any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the pro-
cessing of data relating to him”.132 
The right to be delisted
Whether data protection law can be invoked to remove online content that aects an individual’s 
reputation has been at issue in a recent Spanish case. In 2010, Mr. Mario Costeja González lodged 
with the Spanish Data Protection Authority AEPD Agencia Española de Protección de Datos a com-
plaint against a Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia and Google. He objected against the online pub-
lication of two archived pages of the newspaper of January and March 1998 and the links to these 
webpages which were displayed after entering his name as a query in the search engine. Those 
pages in particular contained an announcement for a forced real-estate auction in relation to the 
recovery of social security debts owed by Mr Costeja González. He argued that the proceedings and 
debts were resolved now for a number of years and that the ongoing reference to them is no longer 
126.   AVMS Directive, Art 10.
127.   Ibid., Art 11.
128.   Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L
281, 23.11.1995, pp. 31-50.
129.   Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protec-
tion of privacy in the electronic communications, OJ L 201, 31.07.2002 pp. 37-47.
130.   Directive 95/46/EC, infra, Art 2(a).
131.   CJEU, Case C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist, 6 November 2003, para. 27.
132.   Directive 95/46/EC, infra, Art 14(a).
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relevant. AEPD rejected the complaint against the newspaper La Vangardia because the information 
had been lawfully published but upheld the complaint against the search engine requesting the 
operator Google to take the necessary measures to withdraw the personal data from their inde and 
to render access to the data impossible in the future.
The ensuing court case eventually resulted in a reference to the CJEU which interpreted the Data 
Protection Directive as placing a responsibility on the operator of the search engine to remove links 
to web pages that are published by third parties and contain information relating to a person from 
the list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of that person’s name.133 The Court 
eplicitly maintains that such an obligation may also eist in a case where that name or informa-
tion is not erased beforehand or simultaneously from those webpages because they were pub-
lished lawfully by third parties containing true information relating to the individual personally.134 
The Court argues that the search on the basis of an individual’s name enables any Internet user to 
obtain, through the list of results, a structured overview of the information relating to an individual 
on the Internet.135 It is through the search engine that a vast number of personal information are 
interconnected and made available which could not have been interconnected or could have been 
only with great diculty.
While the potentially serious interference with an individual’s private life cannot be justied with 
the economic interest of the search engine operator the Court recognizes that the removal of links 
from the list of results could aect the legitimate interest of Internet users in having access to that 
information.136 However, the Court holds that a fair balance should be sought in particular between 
that interest and the data subject’s fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy and the 
right to protection of personal data. In this regard the Court holds that whilst it is true that the data 
subject’s rights also override, as a general rule, that interest of internet users, this balance may how-
ever depend, in specic cases, on the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the 
data subject’s private life and on the interest of the public in having that information, an interest 
which may vary, in particular, accdi  e e paed  e daa jec i pic ie.137
Contrary to what it is often referred to, this judgement does not provide for a general right to be 
forgotten. In order to request from a search engine operator to remove links to web pages that are 
published lawfully by third parties and containing true information relating to the individual person-
ally this information must be found to be “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or ecessive in 
relation to the purposes of the processing at issue carried out by the operator of the search engine”138. 
The Court makes an important distinction between the protected interests of ordinary persons and 
other persons that play a role in public life which should preclude leveraging the right to be delisted 
133.   CJEU, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v AEPD, Mario Costeja González, 13 May 2014.
134.   Ibid. para. 94.
135.   Ibid. para. 80.
136.   Ibid. para. 81.
137.   Ibid., para. 81.
138.   Ibid. para. 94.
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in favour of politicians and other important gures of public life. In the latter case -- very much in line 
with the case law of the ECtHR jurisprudence – the balancing between the Internet users’ interest and 
that of the persons that play a role in public life would play out in favour of the public.  Moreover, the 
legal eect of this judgement is narrow given that the obligation to remove links would only apply 
in the contet of a search query that is based on an individual’s name whereas other search terms 
would not aect the display of eactly the same websites. Last but not least, the website on which the 
personal information about an individual are published remains unaltered and can be found using 
dierent search criteria.
3. Po l ICy An D En f o r CEmEn t  o f  o n l In E Co n t En t  r Eg u l At Io n  In  
Eu r o PEAn  Co u n t r IEs
In addition to the protections vested by the right to freedom of epression, in particular media free-
doms, and to observing best practices emanating from CoE standards-setting and EU law, any state 
intervention with online content pose particular challenges and governance issues. This section in-
troduces this challenges and illustrates them with some eamples of policy and enforcement of on-
line content regulation in European states.
3.1. Caee i ea ieei ie
As a globe-spanning ecosystem the Internet operates to an appreciating etent dierent to tradi-
tional distribution infrastructures which are primarily national, such as broadcasting and print media. 
Moreover, the open and interconnected Internet architecture oers an easy means to provide online 
services and to impart information across borders. A host of intermediaries facilitate dierent func-
tions; most important in the contet of this study are hosting providers which via their platforms host 
third party content that can be accessed by Internet users worldwide. Consequently, any attempt to 
regulate online content inevitably faces issues with jurisdiction and the potentially etraterritorial 
reach of local laws in addition to practical problems when implementing and enforcing local laws 
against foreign operators and providers, primarily.
3.2. r eccii eiaie ad ecee jidici
Any legislation that aims to regulate online content needs to reconcile legislative and enforcement 
jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction which refers to a state legislature’s authority to make its substan-
tive laws apply to particular parties or circumstances is undisputed where it remains within a given 
state’s territory or addresses its residents.139 If the scope of application is not expressis verbis limited 
to national actors and locally hosted content, the regulation of online content, however, is bound to 
take a cross-border eect whenever online content crosses borders and foreign actors are involved. 
What is more controversial but an increasingly accepted basis for legislative jurisdiction is the prohibi-
tion of actions taken in a foreign state that cause injury or bad “eects” in the receiving state or where 
there is a personal link to the jurisdiction cf. infra 1.3.2..140 
139.   Henkin, Louis et al (1993). International Law. Cases and Materials (3d ed. 1993, St. Paul: West Publ.), pp. 1046f.
140.   Ibid.
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The jurisdiction to enforce refers to the authority of a state to use its resources to compel compliance 
with its law.141 Enforcement jurisdiction is signicant weakened in cross-border constellation when 
a party is abroad and there is no other link to the territory of a country against which enforcement 
actions can be directed.142 While the international law principles of comity usually require states to 
assist in the enforcement of judicial decisions of third states such enforcement via proy requires the 
investment of substantial resources, is time-consuming and – more generally – unt as a mode of 
regulatory implementation. In some situations, third countries may refuse international cooperation. 
For eample, in the U.S., the 2010 SPEECH Act prohibits the enforcement of foreign judgments con-
cerning defamation in U.S. courts unless the court nds that the foreign judgment is consistent with 
the First Amendment.143
3.3. t aei ieediaie . IsP’ ae a
State interventions with Internet-mediated communications, in particular measures that have as their 
aim online content regulation, face a particular eectiveness tradeo. On the one hand, with a view 
to enforcement targeting Internet intermediaries can be more eective than going against individual 
users who can be dicult to identify in the rst place. Moreover, measures directed at intermediar-
ies, such as ISPs that host third party content, can be a means to centralize regulatory intervention 
in an otherwise highly decentralized online environment. Quasi a wholesale approach, it would be 
arguably more eective to compel intermediaries’ compliance with regulatory obligations instead of 
enforcement actions against a multitude of individual perpetrators.
However, a regulatory logic that is targeting from the outset the intermediary dees the principle that 
measures should aim rst and foremost at actors that are primarily responsible for infringements. The 
mere fact that otherwise uninvolved intermediaries would be better placed to give eect to regula-
tory obligations would not satisfy this principle of regulatory intervention. Where secondary liability 
has been installed this is commonly made conditional upon additional and distinct criteria that de-
ne under which circumstances the responsibility of an intermediary arises in addition to the primary 
responsible actor. There must be compelling reasons why an intermediary without further ado should 
face the same obligations as the primary responsible actor.
Aside from these principle considerations, what can be gained from compelling intermediaries for 
third parties’ conduct may be quickly set o by the dynamics such a regulatory approach likely gen-
erates.144 When facing etensive liabilities intermediaries will reasonably adjust their activities with 
the aim to reduce their eposure to legal risks and thus introduce all changes deemed necessary 
to the business model. In practice, the massive volume of UGC that is uploaded on leading hosting 
platforms can render it impossible or economically unviable to pre-monitor all content for potentially 
141.   Ibid.
142.   Here is a diǲerence to the ECtHR ruling in Perrin that upheld the conviction of a French national in UK courts who was a resident in the UK 
for publishing obscene material on a webpage operated by a US-based Internet company but accessible by UK Internet users; cf. Perrin v. the United 
Kingdom, application no.5446/03, 18 October 2005.
143.   Cf. Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (SPEECH) Act, P.L. 111-223, codiǳed at 28 U.S.C. para.
para. 4101-4105.
144.   Cynthia Wong and James X. Dempsey. “The Media and Liability for Content on the Internet”, in: Marius Dragomir and Mark Thompson (eds.), 
Mapping Digital Media (London: Open Society Foundation, 2011), p. 11  <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/ǳles/mapping-digi-
tal-media-liability-content-internet-20110926.pdf>  accessed 10 August 2015.
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infringing substance. As an illustration, every minute 300 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube145 
and every second, on average, around 6,000 tweets are posted on Twitter.146 For other hosting provid-
er the situation would be similar relative to their economic capability.
Etensive pre-monitoring duties would eventually lead to the disappearance of certain publically 
available online services that used to cater for hosting users’ content and thus provided the crucial 
platforms of the participatory Internet for all users. In turn, this would harm the diversity of view-
points that characterize the online environment today, produce a chilling eect for the eercise of the 
freedom of epression and reinforce gatekeeper positions at the level of intermediaries.147 
Another problem with monitoring duties is that of “private censorship” and the potential lack of judi-
cial protection for freedom of epression. The freedom and diversity of epression on the new “global 
public squares” of the Internet would be seriously curtailed if the private operators that control such 
space from the Facebook’s and Google’s of the web to national and local platforms acted capricious-
ly and arbitrarily in deciding what speech to greenlight or censor.
It should be recalled in this contet that the save harbours from intermediary liability as laid down in 
the e-Commerce Directive and armed by the relevant CoE standard-setting documents have been 
calibrated precisely to reduce legal uncertainty for ISPs and create a regulatory environment which is 
conducive for the eercise of individual user’s freedom of epression.148
3.4. Epea cie’ epeiece i eci ce eai aai 
Iee ieediaie
The fast evolving online environment and European countries’ dierent legal traditions have led to 
rather diverse legislative practices in their approaches to regulate online content and the etent to 
which such regulation is targeting Internet intermediaries. Member states of the EU and enlargement 
countries have transposed the e-Commerce Directive into their national law which provides for the li-
ability immunity for mere conduit, catching and hosting providers subject to respective requirements 
being met. While this continues to be quite uncontroversial for ISPs whose activities concern mere 
conduit and catching, hosting providers can be much less assured that their immunity from liability 
for the information stored at the request of a user is not contested.
In the recent past a few European countries have initiated legal proceedings against hosting pro-
viders that were challenging various aspects of the safe harbor regimes. The ECtHR Del-judgement 
discussed at length above cf. infra 1.2.3. claries that a commercial Internet news portal providing in 
connection to their own editorial content a comment space for users does not meet the requirements 
of a passive intermediary activity and can thus not invoke the liability eceptions of “passive” hosting 
providers. In an earlier Italian court case involving Google’s video sharing platform YouTube the ap-
peal court did nd in favour of applying the hosting provider’s liability eception.
145.   Cf. <https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html> (accessed 10 August 2015).
146.   Cf. <http://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/> (accessed 10 August 2015).
147.   Ibid., p. 12.
148.   Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee - First Report on 
the application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) (COM/2003/0702 ǳnal) p. 12f.
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Italy: The Youtube case
An illustration of the issues at stake is the Italian Youtube case in which Google eecutives had been 
held personally liable for the 2006 publication of a video clip on YouTube. The video which was tak-
en with a mobile phone showed a boy with down-syndrome who was being beaten and insulted on 
a schoolyard in Italy. The video which was posted on 8 September 2008 was eventually taken down 
on 7 November just a couple of hours after Google was formally notied by the Italian police. Italian 
prosecutors brought criminal charges against four Google eecutives who were sentenced in 2010 
in absentia by the Milan Court of First Instance for defamation and failure to eercise control over 
personal data.149 In this trial, the court did not accept that Google as a hosting provider should not 
be held liable for third party content as provided for in the Italian equivalent of the e-Commerce 
Directive. The court followed the prosecution’s argument that Google should have known better 
and acted on the video clip which gained notoriety as a most-viewed clip and had been a subject of 
heated controversy in Italy for some time already.
In 2012, the Milan Court of Appeal overturned the initial decision, subsequently backed in 2014 
by the Italian Supreme Court the Court of Cassation, on the grounds that Google’s Youtube is a 
host provider merely storing content posted by its the users and Google employees had no prior 
knowledge of the illicit nature of that video.150 Moreover, it was resolved that Google eecutives 
had committed no criminal oence because ISPs have no obligation to inform their users about 
data protection obligations and due to the lack of knowledge about the eistence of the video. The 
Court resolved that the uploader is eclusively responsible for the indeed grave interference into 
the personality rights of the victim of this incident.
In many EU countries, the judiciary has embraced the distinction between “active” and “passive” 
hosting intermediaries that is decisive for the application of the liability eemption in Art. 14 of the 
e-Commerce Directive as transposed into their national laws. However, the criteria national courts 
have successively developed are diverging in detail.151 This case law mainly emanates in the contet 
of copyright enforcement actions but the distinction drawn between “active” and “passive” hosting in-
termediaries can etrapolate to online content that is infringing an individual’s reputation and other 
personality rights. Italian courts, for that matter, are more strict in nding in favour of an “active” pro-
vider which is treated as a publisher and does not benet from the liability eception when it modies 
the content, categorizes it or retains control over what is admitted to its services.152 For French courts 
a hosting provider does not automatically become an “active” intermediary because revenues are 
149.   Milan Court of First Instance, judgment no. 1972 of 4 February 2010; cf. John Hooper, “Google executives convicted in Italy over abuse video” 
The Guardian, 24 February 2010, <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/ feb/24/google-video-italy-privacy-convictions> accessed 10 August 
2015.
150.   Eric Pfanner, “Italian Appeals Court Acquits 3 Google Executives in Privacy Case” The New York Times, 21 December 2012, <http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/12/22/business/global/ italian-appeals-court-acquits-3-google-executives-in-privacy-case.html> accessed 10 August 2015.
151.   Cf. Juan Benjumea Moreno, “Publisher or Technical Provider? Monitoring as Editorial Control and the “Safe Harbor”of Art. 14 E-Commerce 
Directive”, Jura Falconis 49(4), pp. 663-683, 675.
152.   Ibid. with reference to Tribunale di Roma, RTI v Worldstream, 26 October 2011; RTI v YouTube, 16 December 2009; Tribunale di Milano, RTI v 
Italia On Line, 16 of June 2011.
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generated from advertisement placed on the service.153 The Court did also regard re-encoding, for-
matting and organizing of video content as merely technical operations which are below the thresh-
old of what constitutes editorial choice about third party content.154
Only the UK has enacted a dedicated defamation law in 2013 after a long and careful legislative pro-
cess.155 This reform had been guided by an eort to strike the right balance between the right to 
freedom of epression and the protection of reputation in the light of the new online environment. 
Among others, it regulates under which circumstances an action for defamation is brought against 
the operator of a website in respect of a statement posted on the website:
England and Wales: Art. 5 of the Defamation Act: Operators of websites
1 This section applies where an action for defamation is brought against the operator of a website in 
respect of a statement posted on the website.
2 It is a defence for the operator to show that it was not the operator who posted the statement on 
the website.
3 The defence is defeated if the claimant shows that—
a  it was not possible for the claimant to identify the person who posted the statement,
b  the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation to the statement, and
c  the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint in accordance with any provi  
  sion contained in regulations.
4 For the purposes of subsection 3a, it is possible for a claimant to “identify” a person only if the 
claimant has sucient information to bring proceedings against the person.
5 […]
6 Subject to any provision made by virtue of subsection 7, a notice of complaint is a notice which—
a  species the complainant’s name,
b  sets out the statement concerned and eplains why it is defamatory of the complainant,
c  species where on the website the statement was posted, and
d  contains such other information as may be specied in regulations. […]
11 The defence under this section is defeated if the claimant shows that the operator of the website has 
acted with malice in relation to the posting of the statement concerned.
12 The defence under this section is not defeated by reason only of the fact that the operator of the 
website moderates the statements posted on it by others. 
153.   Ibid, p. 676, with reference to Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, TF1 v. Dailymotion, 13 September 2012, <http://www.legalis.net/spip.
php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=3486>  (accessed 10 August 2015).
154.   Ibid.
155.   UK Defamation Act 2013 < http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/contents/enacted> (accessed 10 August 2015).
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Whereas the removal of illegal online content either after a court order or pursuant to a no-
tice-and-takedown procedure is a common practice in most European countries, the blocking of 
access to websites is a much more selectively applied measure that is reserved for the most se-
vere incriminated content. For eample, in a range of European countries, e.g. in France, Germa-
ny, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, website blocking is used to combat the seual abuse 
of minors by preventing the dissemination and access to child abuse images and content. Many 
European countries have no general legislative provisions on the blocking of online content or 
no legislation that would authorize the wholesale blocking of websites.156 The following eample 
of Turkey is thus not representative of European legislative practices but an outlier of state inter-
vention into the open Internet. 
Turkey, a member state of the Council of Europe, has enacted specific laws directed at websites 
hosting third party content and here in particular UGC. The country has a track-record for succes-
sively passing highly restrictive Internet laws in 2007, 2014 and 2015, blocking entire social me-
dia sites and leading the charts for content removal requests with global websites.157 In addition 
to lowering the procedural safeguards for such interferences Turkey has also complemented the 
more archetypical removal of prohibited content with blocking access to websites, sometimes 
whole domains. In most cases, content removal request and blocking orders target ISPs and con-
tent intermediaries directly.
Turkey: Law no. 5651 of 4 May 2007 on regulat ing Internet publications 
and combating Internet offences
Already in 2007 Turkey enacted its Internet Law No. 5651.5 which imposed new obligations on 
websites which provide own content or host third party content to block websites and to take 
down unlawful content as enumerated by the law.158 The catalogue of unlawful content com-
prises of     incitement to suicide; seual abuse of children; facilitation of the use of narcotics; 
provision of substances harmful to the health; obscenity; prostitution; facilitation of gambling; 
the crimes against Atatürk; and betting and gambling. The law grants authority to an imple-
menting agency, the Presidency of Telecommunication and Communication TIB, to issue ad-
ministrative orders to local and foreign online providers. In addition, data retention by ISPs and 
website providers is mandatory under the law in order to facilitate prosecution.
In two decisions, in April and May 2014, ruled the Turkish Constitutional Court that blocking 
access to Twitter and YouTube respectively violated freedom of epression.159 In the latter You-
Tube-case the the administrative authority TIB did not comply with the judgement of the Anka-
ra Administrative Court to lift its blocking order.
156.   Yaman Akdeniz, Freedom of Expression on the Internet: A study of legal provisions and practices related to freedom of expression, the free Ǵow 
of information and media pluralism on the Internet in OSCE participating States (Vienna: OSCE, 2011) < http://www.osce.org/ fom/105522?down-
load=true > (accessed 10 August 2015).
157.   Mustafa Akgül and Mehli Kırlıdoğ, “Internet censorship in Turkey”, Internet Policy Review 4(2),
DOI: 10.14763/2015.2.366
158.   Jeǲrey Rosen, “Google’s Gatekeepers”, New York Times 28 November 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/magazine/30googlet.html> 
(accessed 10 August 2015);
159.   Zeynep Oya Usal, “TR-Turkey: Constitutional Court declares that YouTube ban is unconstitutional”, IRIS 2014-7/33.
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On 2 October 2014, Turkey’s Constitutional Court annulled most parts of a new law which was 
passed in September 2014 as an amendment to the Internet Law 5651.5.160 The aim of this new 
piece of legislation was to protect the dignity and privacy of individuals who become victims 
of defamation on the Internet. It authorized the Turkish Telecommunications Authority TIB to 
order ISPs to block any websites without a court order within four hours of a request, and to 
collect and store all user logs. After the partial annulment of the new law the previous situation 
has been restored which requires a court order in order to compel ISPs to block websites.
In March 2015, the Turkish government passed its latest Internet-related legislation which al-
lows for a temporary ban of websites for the duration of up to 48 hours and the blocking of 
anonymous comments made online, mainly in an effort to reign into Twitter.161
In December 2012, the ECtHR ruled against Turkey in a case concerning the powers to block In-
ternet access under law no. 5651 of 4 May 2007 on regulating Internet publications and combat-
ing Internet offences.162 The facts of the case concerned the wholesale blocking of Google Sites 
– a service which hosts users’ blogs and websites – in the contet of criminal proceedings against 
the owner of one website, who was accused of insulting the memory of Atatürk. The blocking 
order by a local court, however, authorized the implementing authority TIB to block all access 
to Google Sites, which hosted not only the offending site but also the applicant’s site, among 
others. Although neither the hosting provider Google Sites nor Mr Yıldırım’s site were the subject 
of court proceedings the blocking of the entire domain made it technically impossible to access 
any of those sites.
The Court qualified the collateral effect of the blocking order by the public authorities as a restric-
tion on Internet access which interfered with the applicant’s right to freedom of epression.163 
Such restriction on access to a source of information – the Court reiterated -- was only compat-
ible with the ECHR if a strict legal framework was in place “ensuring both, tight control over the 
scope of bans and effective judicial review to prevent any abuse of power.”164 The Court conclud-
ed that the interference was not foreseeable and did not afford the applicant with the degree of 
protection to which he was entitled by the rule of law in a democratic society. Besides, the Court 
also pointed out that the right to freedom of epression in Art. 101 ECHR applies “regardless 
of frontiers”. Consequently, the Court ruled that the over-blocking in this case violated Art. 10. 
Regardless, Turkish authorities continue blocking entire websites on the basis of Internet Law No. 
160.   A.A., “Turkish Constitutional Court strips Internet authority of right to close websites” Hurriyet Daily News 2 October 2014 <http://www.hurri-
yetdailynews.com/turkish-constitutional-court-strips-internet-authority-of-right-to-close-websites.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72479&NewsCatID=339> 
(accessed 10 August 2015); Humeyra Pamuk, “Turkey’s top court annuls part of law tightening Internet controls –media” Reuters 2 October 2015 
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/02/uk-turkey-internet-idUKKCN0HR20B20141002> (accessed 10 August 2015).
161.   Gulsen Solaker and Jonny Hogg, “Turkey proposes tighter internet law, pursues Twitter critic”, Reuters,  22 January 2015 <http://www.reuters.
com/article/2015/01/22/us-turkey-internet-idUSKBN0KV1Y720150122> (accessed 10 August 2015); Emre Peker and Sam Schechner, “Turkey BrieǴy 
Blocks YouTube, Twitter Access and Threatens Google Ban”, The Wall Street Journal, 6 April 2015 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/ turkish-court-bans-ac-
cess-to-internet-sites-over-hostage-crisis-content-1428325451> (accessed 10 August 2015).
162.   ECtHR, Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, application no. 3111/10, 18 December 2012.
163.   Ibid., para. 56.
164.   Ibid., para. 64.
Co mpar at ive st udy o f  best  eu r o pean  pr aCt iCes o f  o n l in e Co n t en t  r egu l at io n52
5651.5 which produces has a collateral effect on numerous other sites hosted at the same service. 
Aside from the issue of over-blocking there are a host of other aspects with the application of the 
Turkish Internet law which do not conform with best practices of online content regulation and 
are criticized for restricting the right to freedom of epression in multifarious ways. 
In a number of European countries, individuals took legal actions against search engine list-
ings of links to content that were deemed to infringe personality rights.165 In implementing the 
2014 CJEU judgement in Google Spain Google offers a form to residence in EU member states to 
request delisting which Google complies with the requirements for delisting are met cf. infra 
2.2.4.. Also a member state of the Council of Europe, Russia has recently passed a law which 
targets Internet search engines.
Russia: Internet Privacy Law
In July 2015, the Russian parliament passed the Internet Privacy Law arguably emulating the 
CJEU precedent in Google Spain. The new law once taking effect in January 2016, after being 
signed by President Vladimir Putin, grants Internet users the right to request the delisting of 
links from the search results to websites with users’ personal information that is incorrect or “no 
longer relevant because of subsequent events or actions”.166 Apart from local search engines, 
the law would apply to foreign search providers as well if their advertisement targets Russian 
users.
3.5. scia edia daic ad aed eec
Online media and Internet communications are known to develop their own dynamics and – 
at times – even influence the agenda of mass media. The virality of online content connotes a 
situation in which information quickly spreads in social media and gains increasing popularity. 
Oftentimes negative or revelatory information about figures in the public interest, such as politi-
cians, and about celebrities have a tendency to seed quickly in social media until it is eventually 
reported in mass media. Named after the singer Barbra Streisand what has become known as the 
“Streisand” effect describes how efforts to suppress a piece of online information can contribute 
to raising the interest of Internet users.167 
165.   E.g., the litigations brought by Max Mosley against Google in Germany, France and the UK which are now settled in a conǳdential agreement, 
cf. Ulrike Dauer and Elisa Fleisher, “Former Formula One Chief Max Mosley Settles Legal Dispute With Google” The Wall Street Journal, 15 May 2015 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/ former-formula-one-chief-max-mosley-settles-legal-dispute-with-google-1431702038> (accessed 10 August 2015).
166.   A.A., “Russian parliament approves Internet privacy bill”, Reuters, 3 July 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/03/us-russia-inter-
net-idUSKCN0PD1OQ20150703> (accessed 10 August 2015.
167.   A.A., “The Economist explains: What is the Streisand Eǲect?” The Economist 15 April 2013 <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-ex-
plains/2013/04/economist-explains-what-streisand-eǲect> accessed 10 August 2015; Mario Cacciottolo, “The Streisand Eǲect: When censorship 
backǳres” BBC 15 June 2012 <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-18458567> accessed 10 August 2015.
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The “Streisand”  effect
The California Coastal Records Project is an award-winning online database documenting in 
thousands of photographs California coastline. One of these photographs captures the resi-
dence of Barbra Streisand in Malibu. In relation to this image Streisand sued the photographer, 
inter alia, for invasion of privacy and asked for $50 million in damages. Before the lawsuit was 
filed, only si times the photo of Streisand’s residence had been downloaded, twice by her law-
yers.168 The publicity, however, surrounding the legal action led to the photo being downloaded 
over 420,000 times within a month. In December 2003, the lawsuit was dismissed.169
There are a number of eamples, where authorities, politicians and celebrities in European 
countries have been caught by similar events when their endeavors to remove online content 
was actually drawing attention to it. A famous football player in the UK for that matter sued 
Twitter after a user revealed that he was the subject of an anonymous privacy injunction pre-
venting the publication of details regarding an alleged affair with a model. When this became 
public more than 75,000 Twitter users posted the footballer’s name and affair claim who even-
tually gave in to his name being published in this contet.170 
4. CONCLUSIONS
Both the EU and the CoE, through their different bodies, have revealed similar understanding of 
what freedom of speech in the online environment entails and how law-makers, regulators and 
the judiciary should operate in order not to stifle the free circulation of voices and opinions on 
the Internet.
The two institutions share a similar favour towards models of self- and co-regulation. For the 
Internet to be an open a participatory environment, regulation should stem from bottom to top 
to largest possible degree. The relevant institutions should try and involve the relevant indus-
try representatives, journalist and judiciary representatives, as well as the civil society, in the 
law-making process. Given the increasingly scattered and diverse nature of the media industries 
in these days, such a feature is key to ensure that no unduly limitations on the flow of information 
on the Web will not be imposed by the means of legal norms.
The impact and significance of new communication technologies within the public sphere is also 
understood in similar terms. The fundamental role of journalist for the democratic debate, and 
the need for strong legal safeguards, is acknowledged by both the EU and the CoE; further to this, 
the possibilities offered by the Web 2.0 for ordinary citizens to have their voices heard by large 
audiences have made both these institutions become increasingly oriented towards a techno-
logically-neutral regulatory approach, capable of protecting voices and opinions irrespectively 
168.   Sue Curry Jansen and Brian Martin (2015) “The Streisand Eǲect and Censorship Backǳre” International Journal of Communication 9 (2015), 
656–671.
169.   Ibid.
170.   Mario Cacciottolo, “The Streisand Eǲect: When censorship backǳres” BBC 15 June 2012 <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-18458567> accessed 10 
August 2015.
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of the medium of choice. As a result, both the EU and the CoE agree that the Internet should not 
be subject to any stricter rules than the analogue media.
Furthermore, the active rise of user-generated content has also raised attention towards the eten-
sion of legal protections in favour of ordinary citizens who partake in the public debate through their 
personal blogs, social network proles etc., and should not face unduly legal threats because of such 
activities. Both the EU and the CoE have been recently epanding their analytical framework of com-
munication rights in order to capture this new social behaviours and their need to be protected by 
the law. It follows from this that providing for suitable legal frameworks for freedom of speech to 
ourish in the media sphere irrespectively of the technology used and of the possible professional 
qualications, or lack thereof, of the persons who engage in such activities is not just an option, but 
a specic obligation on national authorities; in particular, decriminalizing defamation and avoiding 
similar measures that could potentially spark a chilling eect, such as disproportionate civil sanctions, 
represent one of the most urgent needs that national law-makers should fulll. 
The combined orientations of the ECtHR case-law and the Recommendations of the Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Council of Ministers outline a coherent and comprehensive recommended regula-
tory frameworks to apply to the regulation of online content at the national level. Such recommend-
ed norms include:
- in today’s digital environment, literally every individual could reach out to unprecedented 
large audiences: this does not entail that every private citizen should be considered along 
the same lines as professional media outlets – and subject to the same legal rules. National 
law-makers should clarify as much possible what kind of activities amount to professional 
media services and what do not. Suggested indicators include the likes of editorial control, 
outreach, respect of professional and ethical standards among others. From such classicato-
ry eort, it follows that dierent categories professional media outlets, UGC, intermediaries, 
etc. can be regulated dierently, although a minimum threshold of protection of freedom of 
speech must be granted to all.
- The respect of third parties’ right to reputation can be a legitimate limitation to free speech. 
However, the balance between the two should be assessed narrowly and strictly, particular-
ly in light of the fundamental contribution to democracy oered by the media sphere. The 
Court has considered that the boundaries of legitimate speech are particularly broad under a 
number of circumstances, such as:
• whenamatterofpoliticalrelevanceorpublicinterestisatstake;
• whentheallegeddefamatorycontentconcernsvalue-judgments,whichcontraryto
facts cannot be proven true;
• whentheallegedlydefamedpersonisanelectedpolitician,fromwhomagreater
level of tolerance can be epected;
• whentheallegeddefamatorycontentconcernsthegovernmentasaninstitution:in
such cases, no special protection should be granted to the members of such body, 
compared to other ordinary citizens;
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On the contrary, the judiciary has been considered to deserve a higher threshold of protection than 
the eecutive.
- The legal protection of journalists should apply across all available technologies, irrespective 
of the medium of choice;
- Conversely, high standards of professional ethics can be legitimately epected from individ-
uals operating as professional journalists; the same standards cannot be applied to private 
citizens who disseminate their UGC on the web.
A further strand of indications focuses on contemporary questions related more directly with the 
rise of digital technologies. Such indications include:
- For online archives, the Court has indicated, at present time, a preference for the multiple 
publication rule. However, the principle seems to be mitigated by a major caveat the limited 
period of time between the original publication and the actions brought against the media 
outlet following retrieves of the content at stake in order to avoid a chilling eect on archives. 
To any etent, however, online newspapers cannot be requested to delete their archives.
- Jurisdiction represents another emerging issue of Internet regulation. The Court has identi-
ed territory and eective control as criteria for a State to eert its jurisdiction and also apply 
its substantive laws over a dispute. Relevant criteria could be of an objective e.g. the avail-
ability of the content at stake within the State’s boundaries as well as of a subjective e.g. the 
defendant’s awareness of the local laws and the foreseeability of their application nature. 
- While a right to anonymity online does not seem to eist as such, on the other way round 
ISPs are under a specic obligation to protect their users’ identity as a general principle al-
though eceptions can apply, for instance in the case of criminal prosecutions and national 
law-makers should not impose obligations on ISPs to reveal sensitive data of their users to the 
authorities or third parties.
- As a general principle, the liability of ISPs for any wrongdoings committed through their fa-
cilities or services by third parties should be ecluded. However, partial eceptions can apply 
to the case of active intermediaries, i.e. the ISP took a more active role in the dissemination 
of the illegal content than just acting as a mere conduit, in the case the ISP was aware of the 
wrongdoing and, following such awareness, yet did not react readily to remove the relevant 
content.   
European best practice thus forestall any one-size-ts-all measures against defamatory online content 
and need to be eible so as to take into account the particular circumstances of the epression and 
personal characteristics of the parties concerned. Under a graduated and dierentiated approach, 
internet intermediaries’ responsibility for hosting online content of third parties has to be determined 
according to the specic nature of the service they oer. The Council of Europe standard-setting doc-
uments and EU legislation provide for a limitation of liability and exclude a specic duty to monitor 
the information they receive from users on part of hosting providers which in their role and function 
remain passive service providers.
Both the EU and the CoE agree to eclude intermediaries’ liability as a matter of general principle. 
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However, they also both introduce some partial and specic limitations to the principle. Under both 
the EU and the CoE systems, the lack of knowledge of the illegality of the content transmitted is a 
sucient defence to eclude the intermediary’s liability. Further to this, the CJEU has been seemingly 
even more proactive in requesting that intermediaries should have taken some form of active in-
volvement in the wrongdoing in order to be held liable. On the other way round though, the e-Com-
merce Directive has been more eplicit in ecluding interediaries’ liability for a number of activities 
such caching, hosting, and acting as mere conduit. In a similar sense, the EU has also more eplicitly 
– albeit being again in line with the CoE on this – ecluded the possibility for national law-makers to 
lawfully impose duties to monitor the legality of online content on intermediaries.
The distinction between active and passive ISPs has some echoes in the European Court of Human 
Rights Grand Chamber judgement in Del v Estonia and is thus poised to become the transversally 
adopted test by both the European courts. Del concerns a case where the defendant played an ac-
tive role in facilitating the posting of unlawful third-party comments and was thus treated like a “pro-
fessional” publisher with all responsibilities for the content on its website. This judgement, however, 
does not overturn the principle that online intermediaries that provide for the hosting services would 
not be liable for third party content. Despite the dierences at national level and with the notable 
eception of Turkey, European countries’ legislation does not establish a general liability regime for 
providers of hosting services.
Public policy considerations of interventions against online intermediaries, notably hosting provid-
ers, and a review of selected European countries eperiences underscore the importance of striking 
the right balance between the protection of freedom of epression online and the reputation and 
rights of others. Only a graduated and dierentiated approach which takes into account the role and 
activities of intermediaries in relation to online content is capable of ensuring the benets of the 
participatory Internet for all users by preserving an open environment to freely impart and seek in-
formation online. This involves that Internet intermediaries are not deputized to monitor third party 
content per se, ecept where in eceptional circumstance certain providers qualify as media or “active” 
intermediaries.
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PAr t  II  
Al bAn IA An D o n l In E Co n t En t  r Eg u l At Io n
According to International Telecommunication Union Data, 60.10% of the Albanian population had 
access to the Internet as of June 2014, including ed and mobile connections.171 This penetration 
rate places Albania in the mid-range of the Southeastern European region and it is actually slightly 
higher than those of its EU neighbors Italy, Greece and Bulgaria. The rate of broadband coverage is 
another matter, reaching only some 180,000 households by the end of 2013.172 However, since 2011 
there has been an eplosion in the number of mobile phone users with access to 3G technology, 
reaching 1.23 million in 2013.173
Successive Albanian governments have generally adopted a liberal approach toward freedom of e-
pression on the Internet. There is no evidence of systematic or even sporadic ltering or blocking of 
online content, and no requirements for online media and information websites to register or obtain 
any sort of operating permission by the authorities.174 Furthermore, it has been noted that “online 
journalism and online media have oered a greater degree of freedom” to media professionals, espe-
cially vis-à-vis media owners and their interests, which tend to cast a longer shadow in the print and 
electronic media environments.175 
In Albania, online media is generally dominated, with few eceptions, by the websites of the leading 
traditional print and broadcast media. Online-only news and opinion sites, while oering a distinct 
voice, have not been able to signicantly alter the news agenda and investigative journalism remains 
quite limited, both online and oine. The overall media environment is characterized by highly parti-
san approaches, which tend to reect the high level of polarization within the country’s political class 
and its democratic maturity decits.176 
Albanian users can access information and provide UGC freely to Albanian and foreign websites and 
platforms. The dominant language of online media targeting Albanian users is Albanian. Besides, 
leading Albania-based outlets can attract signicant following from Albanophone users in Kosovo 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as the substantial Albanian diaspora in Eu-
rope and beyond. 
A few of the global platforms, such as Google, also provide localized versions of their services. Social 
networks sites and online platforms for professional content and UCG are among the most widely 
used online oers in Albania. Among social networks, Facebook is by far the most popular in the 
171.   Cf. Internetworldstats.com
172.   Electronic and Postal Communications Authority (AKEP), 2013 Annual Report (in Albanian) <http:/ / www.akep.al/ images/ stories/
AKEP/ publikime/ raporte/ RAPORTI-VJETOR-2013.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2015).
173.   Ibid..
174.   Remzi Lani (ed.), Balkan Media Barometer. Albania 2013, pp. 20-21 (Tirana: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2013) <http://www.institutemedia.
org/Documents/PDF/FES%20-%20BMB%20Albanian%202013%20book% 
20ENG%2003_12_2013.pdf> accessed 10 August 2015. 
175.   Ibid. at 60.
176.   Ibid.
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country, with some 1,340,000 registered users in early 2015; 73 percent of its users belong to the 18-
34 age group.177 YouTube and, to a lesser etent, Twitter also have etensive user bases.178 Empirical 
data about whether, where and how often Albanian users contribute and share UGC is not available.
1. Po l It ICAl  DIsCo u r sE An D DEf AmAt o r y  sPEECh  o n l In E
There is also a dearth of reliable data on various aspects of the Albanian online news and information 
environment. There have also been, to our knowledge, no court proceedings or judgments related 
to online defamatory user comments as such. That notwithstanding, there is a good deal of negative 
commentary and public debate about various forms of perceived abuses in this space, including in-
vasion of privacy, hate speech and verbal threats, personal attacks, and a general lack of quality UG 
comments.
According to a recent survey of 39 Albanian online media and opinion sites, ve indicated that they 
allow immediate publication of reader comments without any moderation; twelve answered that 
they allow immediate posting, followed by post-publication moderation; eighteen indicated that 
reader comments can only be posted following approval by a moderator; and four did not allow for 
any user comments.179 The responses would suggest that the great majority of news sites engage in 
some kind of moderation, either pre- or post-publication. 
However, eisting measures seem to have little practical eect. A cursory overview over the leading/
most popular Albanian-language sites reveals low numbers of edited comments and an abundance 
of o-topic and personal attack commentary. This suggests, in turn, that either the sites do not ac-
tually employ the degree of oversight they claim to or they adopt a fairly high bar for censoring user 
comments. There is also, with very few eceptions, a signicant absence of properly elaborated com-
munity standards to guide the user commentary and reporting mechanisms on websites are rather 
the eception than the rule. Some observers have, in fact, noted a trend toward a lighter touch in 
moderating comments in recent years, perhaps due to competitive pressures and/or nancial inabil-
ity to deploy suciently-staed moderation teams. A few site managers have argued that unfettered 
user comments tend to generate greater trac.180
While the link between commercial strategies and moderation practices is not limited to Albania, it is 
important to highlight that online services of global appeal in general tend to have adopted commu-
nity standards and reporting mechanisms. 
177.   Rrapo Zguri, The Development of the Internet and Social Media in Albania, sec. 3.1.  (Tirana: Albanian Media Institute, forthcoming, copy on 
ǳle with the authors).
178.   Ibid.
179.   Ibid., p. 20.
180.   Balkanweb.com and shekulli.com.al have been oǲered as examples of this trend. See Zguro, ibid, p. 21.
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2. t h E Co n st It u t Io n  o f  Al bAn IA
The 1998 Constitution of Albania provides for free speech interests in succinct terms, noting simply 
that freedom of epression, including “freedom of the press, radio and television,” is guaranteed.181 
“Prior censorship of the means of communication” is prohibited.182  A separate provision guarantees 
the right “to obtain information on the activity of state bodies and persons eercising state func-
tions.”183
There is no provision establishing a general right to reputation. Art. 351 guarantees the right of ev-
eryone “not to be forced, ecept when required by law, to make public any data related to his person.” 
Art. 36 guarantees the “freedom and secrecy of correspondence or any other means of communica-
tion.”
There are no special provisions concerning the limitations of these rights. Instead, a general clause 
provides that restrictions on constitutional rights and freedoms “may be established only by law, in 
the public interest or for the protection of the rights of others. Any restriction must be proportional 
to the condition that has dictated it.”184 The second section of Art. 17 species further that restrictions 
on fundamental rights “may not violate their essence” and – in a rather unique provision – that they 
may not “be greater than the restrictions provided for in the European Convention on Human Rights.”
By virtue of this provision, the Albanian Constitution has essentially incorporated the restrictions 
scheme of the European Convention and, by implication, the relevant jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights, into the country’s highest law. The national courts are, of course, free to be 
more protective of guaranteed constitutional rights than the Strasbourg system, but not less so. This 
unusual arrangement has left a number of open questions, such as what to do when one of the two 
systems the Albanian Constitution and the ECHR guarantees a right not specically provided for in 
the other;185 or when the courts are required to resolve clashes between two or more fundamental 
rights of the same level, as is often the case in disputes involving free speech and privacy or reputa-
tional interests. 
Of special interest for our purposes is the prohibition in Art. 22 on prior censorship, which seems to 
allow for no eceptions. However, when read together with Art. 17, it is more likely to be construed by 
Albanian courts in line with ECHR jurisprudence, permitting certain forms of prior restraint in ecep-
tional circumstances clearly delineated by law.186
A Constitutional Court is established, but with limited powers of adjudication on fundamental rights 
matters insofar as it can only hear “complaints by individuals for the violation of their constitutional 
rights to a due process of law.”187 This has generally been interpreted as covering procedural rather 
than substantive due process rights, which means that individuals cannot take a pure freedom of 
181.   Art. 22.
182.   Art. 22.3.
183.   Art. 23.
184.   Art. 17.1.
185.   There are multiple instances of less than complete overlap: the catalogue of rights in the Albanian Constitution is longer and more com-
prehensive than the ECHR’s. On the other hand, there are a few ECHR rights, such as privacy, that are not explicitly included in the Constitution.
186.   Cf. e.g. the case law summary in ECtHR, Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, application no. 3111/10, 18 December 2012.
187.   Art. 131(f), emphasis added.
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epression case to the Constitutional Court, unless and only insofar as it involves a due process claim. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court maintains the last word on substantive fundamental rights disputes 
arising from individual complaints, including in the contet of defamation cases. 
However, the Constitutional Court can hear questions aecting substantive fundamental rights in 
abstract or incidental review proceedings regarding the constitutionality of a statute law or other 
act of government. Such actions can be brought by other branches of government, ordinary courts 
and even non-governmental entities on questions related to their mission.188  In practice, however, 
no such cases have been brought involving matters of defamation law and online freedom of epres-
sion. As we will see in the net sections, recent changes  of the country’s defamation law regime have 
been implemented through legislative changes.
3. l Eg Isl At Io n  In  f o r CE
Since the almost complete repeal of the much-criticized 1993 press law, Albania has had a media stat-
ute composed of a single provision that states simply: “The press is free. Freedom of the press shall be 
protected by law.”189 The rest of the statute was abrogated in 1997, after the civil unrest that followed 
the massive collapse of the Ponzi schemes, as a signal of clear departure from the media policies of 
the previous government. Whatever one might think of such political symbolism, in legal terms it 
means that current Albanian law includes no clear provisions on matters of editorial responsibility 
and related questions.
As a result, the general provisions of the penal and civil codes on, respectively, criminal and civil lia-
bility for defamatory publications apply. These include no specic provisions governing secondary or 
contributory liability for unlawful publications, such as involving the liability or not of distributors, 
sellers and others not bearing primary publication responsibility. Especially the latter contributes to 
uncertainty about the legal responsibilities if any of online platforms hosting and distributing UGC.
This situation did not change substantially with the adoption of the 2013 Audiovisual Media Act 
which includes a detailed provision on the right of reply in audiovisual media.190. Only services that 
meet the denition of audiovisual media are required to comply with the right to reply which does 
not concern most online services. This is in line with the EU acquis pursuant to the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive cf. infra 2.2.2..
In early 2012, the Albanian Parliament adopted signicant reforms to the country’s civil and criminal 
defamation laws. This was the result of a multi-year campaign by civil society groups and like-minded 
parliamentarians, which for the most part helped to bring the eisting legal framework into closer 
alignment with relevant European standards.191
188.   Art. 134.
189.   Law on the Press No. 7756/1993, as amended by Law 8239/1997.
190.   Art. 53.
191.   Cf. Darian Pavli, “Running the Marathon: The Effort to Reform Albania’s Libel Laws,” <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/
arguments-eǲort-reform-albanias-libel-laws> (accessed 10 August 2015). For the sake of disclosure, one of the authors of this paper was closely 
involved with the elaboration of the 2012 defamation law amendments.
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3.1.  Pea Cde
3.1.1. Defamation
Perhaps the most signicant change in the Penal Code PC was the complete repeal of three oenses 
concerning defamation of public ocials, including the president of the republic. 192  Public ocials 
no longer enjoy any special protections in this respect, including no involvement by the police or 
public prosecutors in cases in which ocials claim to be victims of criminal defamation. They must 
prosecute such cases privately, like ordinary citizens, following Council of Europe standards and juris-
prudence by the European Court on Human Rights.
Also signicant was the abrogation of prison terms for defamation oenses.  However, the reform 
fell short of complete decriminalization. Insult Art. 119 PC and libel or more precisely, calumny, Art. 
120 PC193 were maintained as misdemeanors, subject to a ne. In fact, maimum ne amounts were 
increased to 3 million leke ca. 21,000 Euros.  In addition, a conviction under either article will still 
produce a criminal record.
An amendment to the old Art. 120 PC claried that, to be found guilty of calumny, a defendant must 
have acted with “knowledge of the falsity” of the defamatory utterances. This is a fairly high bar for 
the prosecution of such oenses. However, it is not applied strictly by the courts in practice, making 
it easier to le and proceed with charges than the denition of the oense would suggest more on 
this below.
3.1.2. Hate speech
The Penal Code includes a number of provisions that criminalize: the incitement of hatred among 
racial, ethnic and religious groups;194 propagation of hatred, defamatory statements and instigation 
of violence against “parts of the population”;195 incitement of terrorist acts;196 and desecration of state 
symbols eposed by public institutions.197 
In November 2008, a number of oenses committed “through computer systems” were introduced. 
These include: 
− denial or apology of genocide or crimes against humanity, punishable by three to si years of 
imprisonment;198
− dissemination of racist or enophobic statements, punishable by a ne or up to two years 
of imprisonment.199 The provision does not dene what constitutes a racist or enophobic 
statement;
192.   Cf. Law No. 23/ 2012 on Certain Additions and Amendments to the Penal Code (adopted on 1 March 2012, entered into force on 11 April 
2012)
193.   Calumny is deined as “[t]he deliberate dissemination of utterances as well as any other information that harms a person’s honour and 
dignity, committed with knowledge of their falsity.”
194.   Art. 265 PC.
195.   Art. 266 PC.
196.   Art. 232/a PC.
197.   Art. 268 PC, as amended. 
198.   Art. 74/a PC. Interestingly, this is an oǲense only if committed through “computer systems.”
199.   Art. 119/a PC.
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− deliberate insults against a person “because of his ethnic, national, racial or religious alia-
tion”, punishable by a ne or up to two years of imprisonment.200 
The denition of these oenses committed “through computer systems” suers from signicant over-
breadth and lack of qualication. As such, they arguably raise serious questions of compatibility with 
ECHR’s freedom of epression Art. 10 jurisprudence and, therefore, Art. 17 of the Albanian Constitu-
tion.201 In addition, there has been hardly any judicial practice interpreting and applying these pro-
visions, which conversely reects a lack of prosecutions under the new “computer systems” oenses. 
3.2. Cii Cde
Since the introduction of the Italian-inuenced 1994 Civil Code CC, civil defamation claims in Alba-
nia have been governed by its Art. 625, which covers all forms of moral or non-pecuniary damage. 
However, the original tet of Art. 625 was very broad in its formulation, providing no specic guid-
ance for the resolution of civil defamation disputes and leading to signicant variance and inconsis-
tency in the case law. The 2012 amendments202 to the Civil Code introduced a number of important 
clarications in this respect.
First, amendments to Art. 625 claried the establishment of causes of action for harm to one’s hon-
our, reputation or personality. They also added new causes of action for violation of the right to one’s 
name203 and breach of privacy torts.204
Secondly, a new Art. 647/a introduced detailed criteria for assessing the question of civil liability for 
harm to one’s honor or reputation, as well as the amount of compensation, where appropriate.  As a 
general principle, any compensation granted under the new provision should be proportionate and 
seek to “reinstate the right that has been violated,” rather than punish the defendant.205
In addition, the new provision sets out eleven specic, non-ehaustive factors to be taken into ac-
count by the courts in determining liability. These include: whether the allegations constitute fact or 
opinion; whether they are true or false, or constitute accurate references to third-party statements; 
whether they relate to “matters of public interest, or persons in government functions or running for 
election”; and whether the author has complied with any relevant rules of professional ethics e.g. in 
the case of media and information professionals.206
With respect to the amount of compensation awarded, courts are also required to consider whether 
the damages “may signicantly worsen the nancial condition” of the defendant. This would apply, 
200.   Art. 119/b PC.
201.   Cf. e.g., on the question of denial of genocide, ECtHR, Perincek v. Switzerland, Application No. 27510/08, judgement of 17 December 2013; cf. 
Dirk Voorhoof, “European Court of Human Rights: Perinçek v. Switzerland”, IRIS 2014-2:1/1 <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ iris/2014/2/article1.en.html> 
(accessed 10 August 2015). 
202.   Cf. Law No. 17/2012 on Certain Additions and Amendments to the Civil Code (adopted on 16 February 2012, entered into force on 29 March 
2012).
203.   Art. 625(c) CC, as amended.
204.   Art. 625(ç) CC, as amended.
205.   Art. 647/a CC, as amended. 
206.   Ibid.
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for eample, where high damages might cause a media outlet to go bankrupt.207 Finally, the statutory 
limitation period for bringing defamation and privacy actions was reduced from three years to one 
year.208
When the 2012 reforms were being debated in parliamentary committees, the need to regulate ques-
tions of online defamation was briey considered but ultimately dropped as premature. It appears 
that the question has forced itself back into the parliamentary agenda in short order more on this 
below.
3.2. Eecic Cece Ac ECA 
In 2009, Albania adopted an Electronic Commerce Act, which according to the government was “fully 
approimated” with the EU’s e-Commerce Directive following a spate of amendments to the original 
act introduced in 2013. 209 
The ECA follows the structure and largely the substance of the e-Commerce Directive, including with 
respect to the limitations of liability for pure conduit, caching and hosting service providers.210 Unlike 
the e-Commerce Directive, the ECA makes special provision for the liabilities of information location 
services search engines, which are subjected to a notice-and-take down regime similar to that of 
hosting providers.211
Like the e-Commerce Directive, the Albanian ECA makes clear that service providers are under no 
general duty of monitoring and prevention of illegal activities by their uses.212 However, they are re-
quired to provide the “responsible authorities,” upon request and “in compliance with the legislation 
in force,” with access to any data that allows the identication of their users.213
Some important aspects of the e-Commerce Directive liability regime have been lost or changed in 
translation, however. This includes the concept of “eective knowledge” of illegality by hosting pro-
viders,214 which has been transformed into simple “receipt of information” about the supposed illegal 
activities of their third-party users. The e-Commerce Directive duty to remove or disable access to the 
illegal content expeditiously215 upon receipt of eective knowledge has been formulated in the ECA 
as a duty to disable access immediately,216 which imposes a signicantly higher burden on service 
providers.
207.   Art. 647/a, (g) CC.
208.   Art. 115(e) CC, as amended.
209.   Law No. 10128, adopted on 11 May 2009, as amended by Law 135/2013.
210.   Art. 16-19 e-Commerce Directive.
211.   Art. 20 e-Commerce Directive.
212.   Art. 21.1 ECA.
213.   Art. 21.3 ECA.
214.   Cf. Art. 14(1)(b) e-Commerce Directive.
215.   Ibid.
216.   Art. 17.1(b) ECA. The word used in Albanian is “menjëherë.”
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4. Ju DICIAl  Pr ACt ICE
In the eld of defamation, the most signicant and problematic aspect of the case law in recent years 
has been the high level of civil damage awards granted to claimants,217 often reaching tens of thou-
sands of Euros even against individual rather than corporate defendants.218 
It is also noteworthy that most high-prole disputes in recent years have not involved media defen-
dants, but members of parliament and senior politicians suing each other over allegations of corrup-
tion and malfeasance, in a direct etension of political battles into the courtrooms. Many of these 
cases have been brought directly to the Supreme Court because the latter has original jurisdiction 
over cases involving criminal prosecution of members of parliament and senior ocials, and claim-
ants often throw criminal calumny or insult charges on top of civil damage claims. Both sets of claims 
are normally dealt with in the same proceedings.
This level of politicization has not helped the development of the jurisprudence. While the courts tend 
to pay lip service to the relevant ECHR case law, its application remains uneven at best. E.g. in the above 
mentioned Vokshi case, the key ECHR precedent relied on by the Tirana appeals court – arguably the most 
eperienced in the country -- was a marginal judgment on which the Strasbourg panel itself was badly 
divided, with a four to three majority and a strong dissent by the three judges in minority.219 It was an odd 
choice that ignored the seminal judgments of the Strasbourg Court on the question of political speech, 
but that appeared to usefully endorse the appeal court’s conclusion in the case before it.
There have been, to our knowledge, no court cases involving defamation, breach of privacy or other 
violations specically in the online contet.
It remains dicult to tell what lasting eects the 2012 reforms will have, especially in civil defamation 
cases.  The changes to the Penal Code entered into eect more or less immediately since they tend to 
be favorable to defendants and, as such, must be applied to ongoing cases. E.g. any charges brought 
under the repealed oenses of libel or insult against public ocials must be immediately dismissed 
at any stage of the proceedings.220  The amendments to the Civil Code, on the other hand, could not 
be applied in proceedings that started before their entry into force in March 2012.  
The most signicant hate speech case of recent years is the 2006 conviction of ve individuals in connec-
tion with anti-Albanian statements they made during a rally in the southern town of Himara to protest the 
results of the 2003 municipal elections. They were charged with incitement to national hatred and defama-
tion of the Republic and its symbols, and sentenced in absentia to three years in prison each.221  The case is 
currently pending at the ECHR, with applicants claiming violations of Art. 6 and 10 of the Convention.222
217.   Remzi Lani (ed.), ibid., p. 8.
218.   Cf., among others, Vokshi vs Tahiri, a libel dispute between two members of Parliament that resulted in a damage award of 3.3 million leke 
(more than 23,000 Euros), reduced on appeal to one million leke (equal to about seven monthly salaries of an Albanian MP). Tirana Court of Appeal, 
Judgment of 11 January 2013.
219.   Cf. ECtHR, Barata Monteiro Da Costa Nogueira and Patricio Pereira vs Portugal, Application no. 4035/ 08, judgment of 11 January 2011.
220.   Thus, in October 2012, Genc Pollo, then a cabinet member, withdrew a criminal libel case he had brought against a Socialist MP, citing the 
amendments to the Penal Code (though he continued to demand civil damages).
221.   The domestic courts found that the applicants’ statements during the rally included: “Down with Albania”, “Albania is Al Qaeda”, “Vote for 
Greece to be free”, “Himara is Greek”, and “This is Greek land”.
222.   Beleri and Others v. Albania, Application no. 39468/ 09 <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115715> (accessed 10 August 2015). 
Co mpar at ive st udy o f  best  eu r o pean  pr aCt iCes o f  o n l in e Co n t en t  r egu l at io n66
5. PEn DIn g  Pr o Po sAl s
As noted, the question of regulation of liability for defamatory online content was briey discussed at 
the time of the 2012 amendments to the Civil Code.  However, the rst specic proposal to this eect 
was introduced as a private member’s bill by an opposition Member of Parliament and former minis-
ter, Majlinda Bregu, in January 2015 hereinafter the Bregu proposal.223 
5.1. be ppa
The Bregu proposal seeks to introduce a new Art. 617/1 into the Civil Code regulating “liability for 
online publication of comments that infringe upon a person’s honour, personality or reputation.” It 
includes ve main components and sets of provisions:
− It establishes that “the administrator of an electronic portal, including the ocial websites 
of print or visual media” shall be required to “prevent the publication of any comment that 
infringes upon the honour, personality or reputation of any person”.
− A failure to comply with the above duty of prevention renders the portal administrator liable 
for any damages caused by the said publication.
− If the oending comment has been “classied for publication”224 by the portal administrator, 
the latter is required to “delete” the comment “immediately” upon obtaining notication by 
the aected party. A failure to comply with this duty makes the administrator liable for any 
presumably additional damages caused by the publication
− If the author of the comment is identiable, the administrator shall be jointly and severally 
liable with the author for any damage caused. If the author is unidentiable, the administrator 
shall be solely liable.  
− “Any provision made by the portal ecluding or limiting the administrator’s liability for pub-
lished comments” shall be void. Portals must make public the name of the administrator and 
his contact information; failure to do so shall result in the blocking of access to the portal by a 
government agency specied in the proposal.
In a brief statement of intent led in support of her bill, MP Bregu notes that user comments facilitat-
ed by “social media” are often “oensive and denigratory, going beyond [what is permitted by] ethical 
norms.”225 Bregu cites in particular the need to protect the dignity of “female victims of violence” and 
their family members, but does not clarify whether and how this category is disproportionately tar-
geted by oensive UGC, and how the proposal is tailored to ensure protection of their rights – con-
sidering that the proposal’s language is of universal application. Media commentators noted that the 
proposal appeared at a time when the campaign for municipal elections was gearing up, generating 
an epected surge of heated political commentary in online platforms.
223.   Bill No. 229/2015 Proposing an Amendment to the Civil Code of the Republic of Albania, As Amended; available in Albanian at <http://www.
parlament.al/web/pub/pligj_m_bregu_21283_1.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2015). Cf. Annex for an English translation.
224.   It is unclear what is meant by this phrase in the Albanian original.
225.   Cf. in Albanian <http://www.parlament.al/web/pub/relacion_m_bregu_21284_1.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2015). 
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5.2. Ce a  e ppa
The Bregu proposal was referred to the parliamentary Laws Committee, which held a public hearing 
on the matter in late April 2015. After the hearing, the Committee decided to table the discussion in 
anticipation, among others, of a nal judgment by the Grand Chamber of the ECHR in the case of Del 
v. Estonia cf. infra 1.2.3.. There have been no further public developments as of the end of July 2015, 
when Parliament went into summer recess.
Also in April, several Kosovo-based sites released highly embarrassing footage showing a well-known 
Albanian TV host engaging in seual activity. The incident prompted fresh calls for legal interventions 
to ensure protection of privacy online.226
5.3. Cpiace i CE adad ad Eu  acqi
The proposal raises a number of serious questions regarding its compatibility with Council of Europe 
standards and European Union law. A summary of the main shortcomings identied is provided below.
5.3.1. Scope and denitions
If adopted in the current form, the Bregu proposal would become lex specialis, for a category of web-
site operators and certain forms of illegal content, in relation to the general liability rules of the Al-
banian ECA. However, the proposal uses terms that are neither part of the ordinary terminology em-
ployed by comparative law, nor otherwise properly dened in the proposal itself.  
First and most importantly, the proposal does not dene what constitutes an “electronic portal” other 
that the concept includes “the ocial sites of print and visual media”.  If the intent is to cover only 
news and information websites, this should be made clear. At the same time, it has become notori-
ously dicult to dene what constitutes a news or information operation at a time when new tech-
nologies and business models are profoundly and constantly reshaping the gathering and delivery 
of online news. For eample, would a personal blog containing primarily opinion pieces by its owner 
be covered by the proposal? In addition, the proposed introduction of the new rule into the civil code 
instead of sectoral regulation could lend itself to a much broader scope than narrowly dened oper-
ators of “electronic portals”.
It is worth noting, in this respect, that the Del judgment of the ECtHR is applicable to “a large profes-
sionally managed Internet news portal run on a commercial basis which published news articles of its 
own and invited its readers to comment on them.”227 The Court specically noted that the ruling was 
not meant to apply to other Internet fora, such as discussion forums or “a social media platform where 
the platform provider does not oer any content.”228
Secondly, given the relatively high penetration of global platforms in the local market it is astonishing 
that  the proposal’s language does not make any reference to foreign “electronic portals” and what 
is their link to the Albanian jurisdiction. It may nevertheless apply horizontally for all online content 
226.   See, among others, Dardan Mustafaj, “The Sokol Balla case and why we need reforms to protect online privacy,” MAPO, 24 April 2015 <http://
www.mapo.al/2015/04/rasti-ligjor-sokol-balla-ose-pse-duhet-nje-reforme-per-mbrojtjen-e-jetes-private> (accessed 10 August 2015). 
227.   ECtHR, Delǳ AS v. Estonia, application no. 64569/09, 18 March 2015, para. 115.
228.   Ibid., para. 116.
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although it would seem rather dicult for individual claimants to lodge legal proceedings in an Al-
banian court against non-domestic providers of “electronic portals”. In some situations, individuals’ 
interest may be better served if -- instead of pressing legal charges -- they request the removal of the 
defamatory content according to the reporting mechanism of the foreign provider directly where this 
is provided for. 
Finally, the proposal is not eplicit whether it seeks to dene liability in relation to a portal’s own con-
tent, third-party content hosted by a portal or both. Most provisions seem to have been drafted with 
third-party content in mind, but the point needs to be properly claried. As already noted, there are 
no general rules of editorial responsibility in Albanian law, so the lack of precision on this matter may 
add to the legislative confusion. 
5.3.2. Duty to prevent illegal publication of third parties
The most drastic provision of the proposal is the introduction, in its rst and second paragraphs, of a 
duty for portal administrators to prevent the publication of any oending third-party content in the 
rst place. As it should be clear by now, this goes against the very core of the EU approach to interme-
diary liability, which assumes no general duty of ex ante monitoring of the legality of user activities 
facilitated by an intermediary, including a hosting provider.229 
There is no other EU member state which has adopted such a duty of prevention or ex ante liability, 
which would be in clear violation of Art. 15 of the e-Commerce Directive. The only way for an “elec-
tronic portal” to comply with such a duty would be to establish a system of comprehensive prior 
review and authorization of all user comments, which would be a highly burdensome arrangement 
for most online operations. While a number of Albanian online media platforms claim that this is their 
standard modus operandi, they are a minority and do not include the sites with the greatest amount 
of reader comments.230
Such a legal regime would also produce the highest level of “private censorship” of UGC as overcau-
tious portal operators would seek to stay well clear of any epression that might be found oensive 
or controversial, and therefore prevent such content from ever being published.
It is important to note, in this respect, that the Del ruling of the ECtHR Grand Chamber did in no way 
endorse a general duty placed on all hosting providers of prevention of unlawful third-party com-
ments. The Grand Chamber interpreted the judgment of the Estonian Supreme Court as having found 
the portal liable for its failure to remove the oending comments “without delay” after their publica-
tion.231 It was this form of ex post liability that the Grand Chamber found—in the circumstances of that 
case—not to give rise to a violation of Art. 10 ECHR. In so doing, the Del ruling provides no basis for 
imposing on intermediaries a general duty of monitoring and prevention of illegal third-party con-
tent. In view of the broad European consensus on this question, it is highly questionable that such an 
approach would pass Art. 10 ECHR muster at this time.
229.   Art. 15(a) e-Commerce Directive. Cf. Principle 6 of the Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet, adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 28 May 2003.
230.   Rrapo Zguri, infra.
231.   ECtHR, Delǳ AS v. Estonia, application no. 64569/09, 18 March 2015, para. 141 in ǳne and para. 153.
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5.3.3. Within the coordinated eld of the e-Commerce Directive
It should be noted that the requirements concerning the liability of service providers fall inside the 
scope of the coordinated eld of the e-Commerce Directive Art. 2i. The e-Commerce Directive de-
nes a ‘coordinated eld’ within which by the mechanisms of Article 31 and 2 member states may 
not obstruct the internal market. This means that a member state has to ensure that the information 
society services provided by a service provider established on its territory comply with its national 
provisions but may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated eld, restrict the freedom to pro-
vide information society services from another member state. This means that member states of the 
EU could not derogate from the internal market clause of the Directive with legislation that subjects 
providers to stricter requirements than those provided for by the substantive law applicable in the 
member state in which that service provider is established if this would amount to a barrier to provide 
services.
Art. 34 provides an ehaustive list of derogation from the internal market mechanism in the coordi-
nated eld if the measures are necessary for one of the following reason:
− public policy, in particular the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of crim-
inal oences, including the protection of minors and the ght against any incitement to ha-
tred on grounds of race, se, religion or nationality, and violations of human dignity concern-
ing individual persons,
− the protection of public health,
− public security, including the safeguarding of national security and defence,
− the protection of consumers, including investors.
In a 2011 judgement the CJEU has ruled on the mechanism provided for by the e-Commerce Direc-
tive: 
[t]he mechanism provided for by the Directive prescribes, also in private law, respect for the 
substantive law requirements in force in the country in which the service provider is estab-
lished. In the absence of binding harmonisation provisions adopted at European Union level, 
only the acknowledgement of the binding nature of the national law to which the legislature 
has decided to make the service providers and their services subject can guarantee the full ef-
fect of the free provision of those services. Article 34 of the Directive conrms such a reading 
in that it sets out the conditions under which Member States may derogate from Article 32, 
which must be regarded as being ehaustive. 232
As a candidate country Albania is not directly bound by the EU acquis but accession to the EU requires 
the transposition of the EU acquis. The proposed legislation of providers of “electronic portals” would 
be incompatible with the EU acquis for the reason that it subjects service providers from other mem-
ber states to stricter requirements than those in its country of establishment. The obligation placed 
on administrators of “electronic portals” for all hosted content woud amount to a barrier to the free-
dom to provide services in the internal market. The protection of “a person’s honour, personality or 
reputation” – i.e. the aim of the Bregu proposal – would likely not meet the threshold of the admissi-
232.   CJEU, Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10, eData Advertising a.o. v X a.o., judgment of 25.10.2011, para. 59.
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ble grounds for derogations being “the ght against any incitement to hatred on grounds of race, se, 
religion or nationality, and violations of human dignity concerning individual persons” especially when 
weighting in the protection of the right to freedom of epression as protected in Art. 11 of the EU Charter.
5.3.4. Notice and action scheme
The third paragraph of the Bregu proposal appears, at rst sight, to establish a notice-and-takedown 
scheme for defamatory comments published by an electronic portal, similar to the scheme provided 
for in the e-Commerce Directive and the Albanian ECA. There are, however, several important dier-
ences that can be discerned at closer reading. 
First, the Bregu proposal “obliges” the portal to “immediately delete” an oending comment upon 
notication by the aected person. Conversely, the e-Commerce Directive safe harbour conditional-
ity simply renders the intermediary liable for its failure – whether deliberate or simply negligent -- to 
remove, or disable access to, the relevant content upon obtaining knowledge of its illegality. This is 
a crucial distinction, from a freedom of epression perspective, as the e-Commerce Directive allows 
the intermediary to make an independent decision about the legality of the relevant content, its 
newsworthiness and overall journalistic or epressive value—and assume the legal consequences of 
its decision. The Bregu proposal leaves the portals no choice in the matter, subjecting their editorial 
autonomy to the simple claims, or legal interpretations, of a not-disinterested private party.
Secondly, under the e-Commerce Directive scheme, a service provider must obtain “eective knowl-
edge” of illegality. This is a term of art that has been interpreted in somewhat varying fashion by the 
legislatures and courts of dierent EU member states. In some EU countries, proper notication by 
an aected party is considered sucient to give the service provider “eective knowledge.” In other 
jurisdictions, including Finland, Spain and Portugal, only notication by a court or other competent 
public authority is generally deemed to constitute “eective knowledge” of illegality.233 
Thirdly, as already noted, a service provider can lose its safe harbour protection under the e-Com-
merce Directive’s scheme if it fails to act “epeditiously” to delete the supposedly oending content. This 
has been converted in the Bregu proposal in a much more onerous duty to act “immediately.” The e-Com-
merce Directive does not dene “epeditiously,” but its recital 46 provides some guidance in stating that 
“the removal or disabling of access has to be undertaken in the observance of the principle of freedom of 
epression and of procedures established for this purpose at national level.” This suggests that the Direc-
tive does not require measures which would take forms that would infringe the rights of innocent users or 
“leave the alleged infringer without due possibilities of opposition and defence.”234 
5.3.5. Lack of notication procedures and due process safeguards
Another signicant shortcoming of the Bregu proposal is the lack of any procedures and due process 
safeguards regarding the notice-and-takedown system it establishes. Providing basic procedures by 
233.   Cf. Audiencia Provincial of Madrid (9th Section), Paloma v. Google, 19 February 2010, Judgment 95/ 2010 <http:/ / audiencias.vlex.es/
vid/ -220093371> (accessed 10 August 2015); Cf. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Case C-324/09, L’Oreal SA v. eBay International AG, 9 
December 2010, para. 160.
234.   Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, ibid., para. 158.
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law is important to ensure that the takedown scheme is not abused by frivolous or aggressive com-
plainants, at the epense of open debate. While the e-Commerce Directive itself does not include 
procedural clauses, many of the national laws implementing the e-Commerce Directive do. 
In France, for eample, a valid notication must include details such as the full identity of the notify-
ing party, the date and precise location of the purportedly illegal information, and the legal basis for 
the complaint.235 The 2013 Defamation Act for England and Wales and its implementing regulations 
establish even more detailed requirements for notications.236 These include: the name and email 
address of the complainant; the URL or location of the statement complained of; an eplanation of 
what the statement says and why it is defamatory of the complainant; the meaning the complainant 
attributes to the statement complained of; the aspects of the statement which the complainant be-
lieves are factually incorrect or opinions not supported by fact; conrmation that the complainant 
does not have sucient information about the author to bring proceedings against them; and con-
rmation of whether the complainant consents to his name and email address being provided to the 
poster.
Furthermore, the Bregu proposal is one-sided in the sense that it makes the takedown of disputed 
content automatic upon the mere request of the aected party, but provides no remedy whatsoever 
for the author of the comments, whether anonymous or identiable. It is considered a good practice 
in the eld that, prior to any takedown, the service provider grant the author of the disputed com-
ment a so-called counter-notication, which enables the author to defend the legality of her content 
and provide any other relevant information within a reasonably short amount of time.237 The author 
of the content should also have the right to seek the reinstatement of any information that has been 
improperly taken down, whether by the service provider itself or by judicial order.
It is dicult to imagine that the current one-sided arrangement in the Bregu proposal would be found 
balanced or compatible with Art. 13 of the ECHR, which requires states parties to provide an “eective 
remedy”—normally by a court of law—for violations of any of the Convention rights, including those 
guaranteed by Art. 10 ECHR. In the Del case, the relevant reader comments on the Estonian Internet 
news portal were found by the Grand Chamber to be so etreme as to fall outside the scope of pro-
tection of Art. 10 ECHR altogether. For this reason, the Court did not nd it necessary to discuss the 
remedies and procedural protections to which the authors of the comments were entitled. That is not 
the case with allegedly defamatory statements, interference with which must be justied on the basis 
of Art. 10.2 of the Convention.
5.3.6. Questions of “private censorship”  and post-publication liability
The question of private censorship presents itself forcefully when considering the Bregu proposal. 
That is because such schemes generally permit the censoring of speech merely on the basis of a pri-
vate complaint and/or the assessment of a private service provider, in a departure from the general 
principle that free epression in the public sphere should only be suppressed by a court of law after 
235.   Law No. 2004-575, art. 6-I(5).
236.   UK Defamation Act 2013 < http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/contents/enacted> (accessed 10 August 2015).
237.   ECtHR, Delǳ AS v. Estonia, application no. 64569/09, 18 March 2015, para. 117.
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proper consideration in a normally adversarial process. Furthermore, and as already noted, the pro-
posal would hold “electronic portals” liable for defamatory third-party comments even in the absence 
of any notication by aected persons.
It is true that, in the Del case, the ECtHR Grand Chamber accepted a legal regime of post-publication 
liability despite the absence of any private notication—or more precisely, it found that the Estonian 
portal should have removed the impugned comments on its own motion and “without delay”, irre-
spective of whether anyone had complained about them. However, the Court’s holding was based 
on the specic circumstances of the case, which involved statements that “mainly constituted hate 
speech and speech that directly advocated acts of violence.”238 Thus, the Court added, “the establish-
ment of their unlawful nature did not require any linguistic or legal analysis since the remarks were on 
their face manifestly unlawful.”239
The above suggests that the Grand Chamber’s approach might well be dierent in cases involving 
more comple disputes, including most libel and privacy infringement cases, where the legal ques-
tions underlying the lawfulness or not of the challenged statements are typically less clear cut and 
require careful judicial consideration. It is worth recalling here that Art. 625/a of the Albanian Civil 
Code requires the courts to consider no less than eleven separate elements of fact and law in resolv-
ing moral damage cases.
The ECtHR Grand Chamber itself conceded in Del that a notice-and-takedown system as contained 
in the e-Commerce Directive, “[i]f accompanied by eective procedures allowing for rapid response, 
… can in the Court’s view function in many cases as an appropriate tool for balancing the rights and 
interests of all those involved.”240 In other words, service providers may be required to adopt special 
scrutiny and act proactively to remove third-party content – in the absence of notication by aected 
parties and without any judicial involvement -- only where such content is etreme and “manifestly 
unlawful.” In contrast, the Bregu proposal is open-ended in its scope, covering any and all statements 
alleged to infringe upon a person’s “honour, personality or reputation.”
6. Issu Es w It h  sEl f -r Eg u l At Io n  
As noted in the introduction to this section, the eorts of Albanian online news sites to adopt and 
enforce ethical standards for user-generated content are relatively rudimentary. There is no indication 
that the sites employ, for eample, any automatic ltering for vulgarities and in general there is little 
editing or moderation post publication. 
An often quoted eplanation for this state of aairs is the precarious nances of most online news 
sites and their inability to employ properly staed moderation teams. Even the leading online news 
sites, which can receive thousands of user comments on a daily basis, operate with dedicated teams 
of no more than 4-5 editorial sta, some of which act as part-time moderators for user comments.241 
238.   Ibid., para. 117
239.   Ibid (emphasis added).
240.   Ibid., para. 159.
241.   Rrapo Zguri, ibid..
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There are very few sites, belonging primarily to the major TV stations, that are able to deploy full-time 
moderators and advanced UGC technology.242 Basic technological solutions are also lacking: for e-
ample, most sites do not oer an easy option to report abusive comments or notice-and-takedown 
mechanisms. Partly for this reason, the legal remedies provided for in the Albanian ECA seem to go 
largely unused by persons aected by defamatory or otherwise illegal speech.
Financial or technological restraints cannot eplain, however, certain basic failures of the online news 
and opinion sites. Thus – with the eception of Shqiptarja.com/A1 Report, which has developed and 
posted a detailed and sophisticated code of journalistic ethics – sites only tend to oer the most basic 
UGC guidelines for their user community.
In general, user comments contain signicantly more oensive speech than professionally produced 
content. Objectionable language tends to be driven by the country’s highly polarized politics; there 
is relatively little hate speech based on race, ethnicity or religion and it is, for the most part, limited 
to fringe opinion sites and the social media.243 Interestingly, online-only news sites seem to main-
tain a healthier comment environment than mainstream media sites, which are more politicized.244 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a relatively small number of users, using multiple anonymous ac-
counts and perhaps acting at the behest of political actors, is responsible for a disproportionately 
large amount of oensive speech.
A number of possible self-regulatory solutions appear obvious in the current state of aairs. Some 
would be relatively inepensive technological solutions, such as adopting Albanian-language auto-
matic lters to ag obscene language to website moderators, and reporting mechanisms for abusive 
commentary. More detailed guidelines for UGC are needed as well as a greater eort to enforce such 
standards through dedicated moderators and the takedown of objectionable comments. Failing that, 
online news sites can ecept growing public pressure in the coming years to force them to rein in 
abusive comments, including through new laws and legal proceedings.
The authorities -- and in particular specialized agencies such as the Electronic and Postal Commu-
nications Authority and the Data Protection Commissioner -- should also do more to educate the 
public about already available remedies in Albanian law against online defamation, infringement of 
privacy and other unlawful content. These include the hardly used notice-and-takedown system of 
the Albanian ECA.
7. t r An sn At Io n Al  En f o r CEmEn t
The Albanian authorities have shown self-restraint in not seeking to directly enforce Albanian law 
against transnational hosts and other online service providers. In fact, there have been no known 
eorts of such a nature to date, ecluding the possible use of mutual legal assistance procedures or 
other inter-governmental mechanisms.
242.   The website of Top Channel, for example, has only allowed user comments since the summer of 2014, using Disqus software. However, the site 
does not appear to encourage user comments, which are relatively sparse.
243.   Ilda Londo, Hate Speech in Online Media in Southeast Europe (Albania section), Tirana: Albania Media Institute, 2014 <http:/ / www.
institutemedia.org/ Documents/ PDF/ Hate%20speech%20in%20online%20media%20in%20SEE.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2015).
244.   Ibid.
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No ocial data are available on this topic. However, the transparency reports of major global provid-
ers like Google and Facebook are informative. According to the Google Transparency Reports, there 
have been zero requests by Albanian authorities to Google for content removal since the start of 
relevant reporting by the search engine in December 2009.  In 2014, Google reported the rst two 
requests by Albanian authorities for user data, involving three user accounts; both requests were 
denied.245 
The national authorities have been more active in requesting user data from Facebook, which is not 
surprising given the social network’s popularity in the country. In 2013 and 2014 – the only period 
for which Facebook has made such data available to date -- there were a total of 32 requests for user 
data involving 61 accounts, with a 66.5% average rate of “some data produced” by Facebook.246 There 
was a spike in user data requests in the second half of 2014 16 requests involving 34 accounts, but 
the data production rate went down to 25% for that period, from 75-83% in the three prior reporting 
periods.247 This indicates a possible trend toward more aggressive use of the Facebook self-policing 
mechanism by the Albanian government.
In contrast, during the same two-year period, Facebook reported zero content restriction requests 
– typically, requests to delete specic unlawful content posted by its users -- from Albania, whether 
by the authorities or any other local source.  This suggests that no government agencies, NGO watch-
dogs or legal professionals engage in systematic or even sporadic monitoring of hate speech or other 
unlawful online publications involving users under the Albanian jurisdiction. Such passivity stands 
in contrast to the eorts of both governmental and NGO entities in many European countries, which 
seek to work with – and sometimes in open confrontation against -- major service providers to nd 
innovative solutions to the problem of harmful speech online.248  While such eorts are sometimes 
controversial from a free speech perspective, it can be seen as a missed opportunity by Albanian 
actors to make use of the main global OSPs’ self-policing mechanisms as a cheaper and simpler alter-
native to law enforcement or private litigation.
8. Co n Cl u sIo n s w It h  Po l ICy r ECo mmEn DAt Io n s
Against the background of European best practices in online content regulation, the study consid-
ered in  particular a pending legislative proposal in Albania which seeks to introduce “liability for 
online publication of comments that infringe upon a person’s honour, personality or reputation” on 
providers of “electronic portals”. The study’s assessment of the proposal concludes that it conicts 
with the graduated and dierentiated approach promulgated by the relevant CoE standard-setting 
instruments, vastly eceed the ECtHR interpretation in the Del judgement and would clash with the 
245.   Cf. <http://www.google.com/ transparencyreport/userdatarequests/AL/> (accessed 10 August 2015). Google does not provide speciǳc reasons for 
denial of such requests.
246.   Cf. <https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/Albania/2014-H2/> (accessed 10 August 2015). Facebook does not provide details for requests 
ǳled by speciǳc governments, but includes this general explanation: “The vast majority of these requests relate to criminal cases, such as robberies or 
kidnappings. In many of these cases, these government requests seek basic subscriber information, such as name and length of service. Other requests 
have asked for IP address logs or actual account content.” Cf. <https://govtrequests.facebook.com/about/> (accessed 10 August 2015). 
247.   Ibid.
248.   One recent example of this approach has been the high-proǳle litigation of the Spanish Data Protection Authority leading to a judgment of the 
CJEU recognizing the right to have certain personal data removed from search engine results of one’s name; CJEU, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, 
Google Inc. v AEPD, Mario Costeja González, 13 May 2014, discussed infra at 2.2.4.
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EU aquis, particularly with Art. 14 and 15a of the e-Commerce Directive.
In light of the above considerations, the necessity of a legislative intervention in Albania at this time, 
along the lines of the Bregu proposal, appears less than compelling. It may be more advisable, as in 
the Estonian Del case which was based on the general civil law defamation rules, to allow the courts 
to develop more nuanced rules in this eld, under the guidance of the ECtHR. With the eception of 
England and Wales, which undertook in 2013 long-planned, comprehensive reforms of their defama-
tion laws, no other EU member state to our knowledge has adopted specic laws for online defama-
tion. This has allowed their court systems to gradually develop the case law, taking account of fast 
changes in technology, information ecosystems and societal attitudes.
If enacted this legislation would retrograde the advancements made with the 2012 reforms to the 
Albanian civil and criminal defamation laws introduce an unorganic and unbalanced measure direct-
ed against all content and hosting providers that is ecessively restraining the freedom of epression 
online.
In particular, the study identies the following shortcomings:
1. The denition of “electronic portal” to overly broad, thus capturing “passive” intermediaries 
contrary to European best practices and the EU aquis; the denition does also not allow for 
taking into account the dening characteristics of the service but automatically places the 
obligations of “active” intermediaries on all providers;
2. To the etent that “passive” intermediaries would be regulated the proposal contradicts with 
Art. 17 of the Albanian ECA which provides for a liability eception for hosting services ana-
logue to Art. 14 of the EU e-Commerce Directive;
3. The obligation on portal administrators to prevent the publication of any oending third-par-
ty content amounts to a duty to monitor information contrary to the EU aquis;
4. The obligation would appear to apply horizontally to all providers of “electronic portals” irre-
spective whether they are established in Albania or abroad but the proposal does not include 
issues of jurisdiction or consider practicalities of etraterritorial enforcement.
5. This in turn can amount to a violation of Art. 3 2 of the e-Commerce Directive because it 
would alter the requirements for providers established in another member state within the 
coordinated eld of activities;
6. The general obligations for the content and the take-down procedure do not allow for a bal-
ancing eercise taking into account the type of speech, the role of the actors involved, the 
political relevance and public interest, among others, pursuant to the established case-law of 
the ECtHR; 
7. The legislative proposal lacks procedural safeguards, in particular that courts should primarily 
assess whether online content is infringing third party’s reputation, or at least which require-
ments the notice has to comply with and other rights and means to assess and protest the 
notice; and
In light of the above considerations, the study recommends the Albanian legislator not to adopt this 
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legislative proposal. It should be recalled that the Estonian Del case was based on the general civil 
law defamation rules and not on dedicated piece of legislation placing a general obligation on pro-
viders of hosting services for all published content, irrespective whether this is own or third party 
content and the provider’s activities are passive intermediary or rather media/ “active” intermediary. 
In light of the fundamental right to the freedom of epression and the recommended nuanced ap-
proach Albanian decision-makers should allow the courts to develop case-law, under the guidance of 
the ECtHR, based on the criteria in Art. Art. 647/a of the civil code.
In order to communicate how the present legal framework applies to the situation of hosting provid-
ers it is recommended:
1. to disseminate this study widely to all stakeholders;
2. to organize a workshop for policy-makers and stakeholders covering the legislative status 
quo in Albania against the backdrop of European best practices and developments in the 
case law of the European courts; in particular the workshop should aim to convey the quali-
ed requirements promulgated in the ECtHR Del-judgement;
3. to organize a workshop for judges on the case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU relevant to 
defamatory content online, in particular how both courts balance the infringement of indi-
vidual’s reputation and other rights with the freedom of epression online;
4. to promote self-regulation of hosting providers and assist with an overview of available mea-
sures
5. to educate the public about already available remedies in Albanian law against online defa-
mation, infringement of privacy and other unlawful content. These include the hardly used 
notice-and-takedown system of the Albanian ECA.
6. to set-up a dedicated website to promote the public awareness of individual user’s possible 
remedies against online defamation, infringement of privacy and other unlawful content. In-
ter alia, this website should provide an accessible overview over the mechanisms deployed by 
the most commonly used hosting providers in Albania and links to their reporting tools and 
notice-and-action schemes.
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An n exes
Albania legislation relevant to online content 
regulation, in particular defamation laws, and hosting 
intermediaries liability for third party comments
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1. br Eg u  Pr o Po sAl 249
r EPubl IC o f  Al bAn IA
t hE AssEmbl y
Dr Af t  l Aw
n ______ / 2015
o n  An  ADDIt Io n  t o  l Aw  no  7850, DAt ED 29 J 1994 “CIv Il  Co DE o f  t hE r EPubl IC o f  Al 
bAnIA,” As AmEnDED
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Constitution, and upon a proposal of a Member of Parliament,
THE ASSEMBLY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
DECIDED
To make the following additions to Law No 7850, dated 29 July 1994 “Civil Code of the Republic of 
Albania,” as amended:
Aice 1
Article 617/1 with the following content shall be added after Article 617 of the Civil Code:
“Aice 617/
l iaii  ie picai  ce a iie  a pe’ , peai  
epai
The administrator of an electronic portal, including ocial websites of printed or visual media, shall 
prevent publication of any comment that infringes on a person’s honour, personality or reputation.
In case of failure to prevent publication of comments that infringe on a person’s honour, personality 
or reputation, in accordance with the legal obligation set out in the rst paragraph of this Article, the 
administrator of an electronic portal shall be held liable for damage caused. 
If a comment that infringes on a person’s honour, personality or reputation is classied for publication by 
the administrator of an electronic portal, he/she shall immediately delete it once notied by the person 
claiming that such comment infringes on his/her honour, personality or reputation. In case of failure to 
249.   Draft legislation in Albanian <http://www.parlament.al/web/pub/pligj_m_bregu_21283_1.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2015). Unoǵ cial trans-
lation into English by the OSCE.
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immediately delete the comment upon the request of the person whose honour, personality or reputation 
has been infringed, the administrator of the electronic portal shall be held liable for damage caused.
When the person who writes the comment is identiable, the liability of the administrator of the electronic 
portal shall be solidary to that person’s. When the person who writes the comment cannot be identied, 
the liability for damage caused shall rest only on the administrator of the electronic portal, who allowed 
the publication of the comment or failed to take necessary measures to ensure timely deletion thereof.
Damage caused under this Article shall be classied as non-property damage arising from infringe-
ment of a person’s honour, personality or reputation.
Any clause posted on the electronic portal that eempts or limits the administrator’s liability on pub-
lished comments shall be invalid. Any electronic portal must publicly make available the full data of 
the administrators and modes of contact with him/her. The authority responsible for Electronic Com-
munications shall forbid public access to any electronic portal that fails to abide by this obligation.
Aice 2
t ai pii
The administrator of an electronic portal, including ocial websites of printed or visual media, shall, 
within 30 days from the date the present law enters into force, publish his/her full data in the portal 
and provide full information on modes of contact with him/her. Means of contact with the adminis-
trator shall ensure recording of any request or complaint that the administrator may receive about 
comments that infringe on a person’s honour, personality or reputation.
The competent authority for Electronic Communications shall monitor observation of this obligation 
and shall take measures to prevent public access to the electronic portal, when the full data of the 
administrator of the portal and modes of communication with him/her are not published.
Aice 3
This law shall enter into force 15 days from its publication in the Ocial Gazette.
Approved on _____ / ______ / 2015
SPEAKER
ILIR META
Proposing MP
(signature)
MAJLINDA BREGU
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2. PEn Al  Co DE (In  Ex t r ACt s)250
l a n. 7895
Cr ImInAl  Co DE o f  t hE r EPubl IC o f  Al bAn IA
Aice 74/a 
Cpe dieiai  aeia i a  ecide  cie aai ai
Oering in public or deliberately disseminating to the public through computer systems materials 
that deny, minimize signicantly, approve of or justify acts that are genocide or crimes against hu-
manity. 
Aice 119 
I 
Deliberate insult of the person constitutes a penal misdemeanour and is sentenced by nes from fty 
thousand ALL up to one million ALL. 
The same oense, when is committed publicly, injuring several persons and more than once, consti-
tutes a penal misdemeanour and is sentenced by nes from fty thousand ALL up to three millions 
ALL.
Aice 119/a
Dieiai  aci  epic aeia  e cpe e
Oering in public or deliberately disseminating to the public through computer systems materials 
with racist or enophobic content constitutes a criminal contravention and is punishable by a ne or 
imprisonment up to two years.
Aice 119/
Ii de  aci  epic ie  e cpe e
Intentionally insulting a person in public, through a computer system, because of ethnicity, nation-
ality, race or religion constitutes a criminal contravention and is punishable by ne or imprisonment 
up to two years.
250.   Unofficial translation into English from Legislationline <http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes> (accessed 10 August 2015).
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Aice 120
Deaai
Intentional dissemination of talks, and any other information knowing that they are false that injure 
the honour and dignity of the person, constitutes penal misdemeanour and is sentenced by nes 
from fty thousand ALL up to one million and ve hundred thousand ALL. The same oense, when is 
committed publicly, injuring several persons and more than once, constitutes a penal misdemeanour 
and is sentenced by nes from fty thousand ALL up to three millions ALL.
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3.  CIv Il  Co DE o f  Al bAn IA (In  Ex t r ACt s)251
 l Aw  n. 7850
o n  t hE CIv Il  Co DE o f  t hE r EPubl IC o f  Al bAn IA
Aice 625, a aeded
A person who has suered non-pecuniary damage shall be entitled to compensation when:
…b his honor, personality or reputation has been harmed;
…d the memory of a dead person has been defamed. In such cases, the surviving spouse or relatives 
of the dead person to the second degree may request compensation of the non-pecuniary damage.
Aice 647/a
Compensation of non-pecuniary damage to a person’s honor, personality or reputation shall seek the 
reinstatement of the aected right, in proportion to the harm suered and pursuant to the circum-
stances of each case. In determining civil liability and the quantum of non-pecuniary damage, courts 
shall consider the following, among other, considerations:
a The manner, form, and timing of the dissemination of the [relevant] utterances or conduct;
b The degree to which the author of the utterances has acted in compliance with standards of 
professional ethics
c The forms and degree of fault [dolus]
ç Whether the utterances include correct references to or quotations of utterances by a third person
d Whether the utterances are true, especially in cases of harm to reputation
dh  Whether the utterances are related to the harmed person’s private life and their relevance to 
matters of public interest 
e Whether the utterances constitute opinions or contain only insignicant factual inaccuracies; 
ë  Whether the utterances are connected to matters of public interest, or to persons holding 
government positions or running for election;
f Any actions undertaken to prevent or reduce the degree of harm, such as the retraction of 
false statements, as well as any other measures taken by the author of the utterances to rein-
state the honor, personality or reputation of the harmed person;
g Whether the author of the utterances has proted from their dissemination, as well the mea-
sure of such prot
gj  Whether the amount of compensation awarded may signicantly worsen the nancial con-
dition of the liable person. 
251.   Own translation.
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4.  ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACT (ExCERPT)252
l a n. 10128 a aeded
El ECt r o n IC Co mmEr CE ACt  o f  t h E r EPubl IC o f  Al bAn IA
Aice 17
hi 
1. In case when an information society service consists in saving/storing of information obtained by 
the service recipient, the service provider of the information society service is not responsible for 
the information saved upon request of the service recipient if the service provider:
2. Is not aware or cannot be aware of the illegal activity of the recipient or the content of informa-
tion and as for damage claims, is not aware of the facts and circumstances from which illegal ac-
tivity or information stems from; b upon receiving this information acts immediately to remove 
or deactivate access to the information.
3. Point 1 of this article is not applicable when the service recipient acts on behalf or under the con-
trol of the service provider. 
Aice 18
mea  cai  iai
Service providers that generate, through electronic means, access to information for third parties 
shall not be liable for such information provided:
a They are not, or cannot be, aware of the unlawful activities of the recipient [of the information] or 
the data contained in the information;
b Upon obtaining knowledge of the fact of unlawful activity or data, they remove or disable access 
to such data.
Aice 19
Iepi  peei  caei 
Despite of what is provided by the dispositions of this law, in Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18, the service 
provider is obliged to stop or warn a violations if this is required by the court or the authority respon-
sible in line with the legislation in power. 
252.   Own translation.
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Aice 20 
seice Pide o iai  
1. the service provider of the information society services which are an object of this chapter do not 
have obligations to oversee the information they transmit or save, as well as for searching of facts or 
situations that demonstrate illegal activities. 
2. The Service provider of the information society noties immediately the responsible authorities in 
case there is reasonable doubt that the service user: a are engaging in illegal activity b have present-
ed illegal information. 
3. The service provider presents to the responsible authorities, upon their request and in line with the 
legislation in power, all the information that enables the identication of the recipient of the service. 
 
 



